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ABSTRACT 
 
Innovation is considered an imperative for firm survival and growth. Firms invest 
considerable amount of time and resources on their innovation activities. Consequently, 
they are willing to inform their investors of the output of these investments, namely their 
new product releases, so that investors can correctly adjust the price of firms’ stock 
accordingly. For decades, researchers have been studying investors’ reaction to firms’ 
new product announcements. However, several aspects of the manner in which these 
announcements are evaluated by investors are still unexplained. This dissertation 
attempts to shed light on two important yet overlooked aspects in estimating the value of 
innovation.  
The first essay investigates how firms’ success at past new product introductions 
helps investors form high expectations from the firms’ future innovation output, and 
leads to a smaller investor reaction to subsequent new product announcements by these 
firms. The second essay shows that concurrently announcing new product releases with 
other positively valenced corporate news leads to an increase in firms’ visibility in the 
stock market and subsequently it increase firm’s stock price. This increase is greater for 
firms that face a higher investors’ expectation or for firms that have a small investor 
base. 
Both essays employ the event study method over large samples of new product 
announcements and provide hitherto unexplored boundaries for the valuation of new 
products, as well as helpful insights to managers in terms of when and how to introduce 
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their new products in order to maximize their firms’ investor recognition and stock 
market value. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Innovation is critical to the success of firms. In today’s competitive business 
world, firms that fail to innovate run the risk of falling behind and losing business to 
competitors. Therefore, managers need to have a clear understanding of the effect of 
their innovation output on the firm’s long term performance so that they can make more 
informed resource allocations and investments for innovation. But how are firms’ 
innovation outcomes evaluated?  
Researchers in marketing have long been seeking to quantify the impact of firms’ 
innovation activities on firm value (Sorescu 2012).  Many studies have investigated, for 
instance, the shareholders’ reactions to firms’ new product announcements, treating the 
announcement as an outcome of innovation activities (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991; Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches 1995; Lee et al.2000; Sharma and 
Lacey2004; Sood and Tellis 2009; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha2007). Yet, there are 
many unexplained aspects about the manner in which shareholders view and evaluate 
these innovation activities in various scenarios.  
This dissertation attempts to shed light on two of the unexplored factors in 
investors’ reaction new product announcements. Specifically, it investigates (1) the 
effect of investors’ expectation of firms’ past innovation on their valuation of firms’ 
future innovation output, and (2) the effect of timing and manner of the firms’ 
communication of their innovation to investors.  
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The first essay examines why investors appear to respond less favorably to 
announcements issued by firms that are known to be successful innovators. In this essay, 
I investigate how a firm’s history of new product announcements shapes investors’ 
expectations of its future innovation output and how investors react when these 
announcements materialize.  
The results of my first essay suggest that successful innovators receive 
diminishing abnormal stock returns from subsequent new product announcements, while 
it also documents higher value already incorporated in these firms stock price before the 
announcement is made. This result is also supported by my analyses of long-term stock 
returns, which shows that firms that fall short of investor expectations for their 
innovation output experience greater losses in the long run. Intuitively those that 
successfully exceed investor expectations gain more over the long-term. 
In my second essay, I investigate the financial consequences of announcements 
of new products made concurrently with other corporate news by the same firm. I 
propose that making concurrent new product announcements benefits the firm by 
increasing the visibility of their stock and consequently the stock price. I then argue that 
these benefits are greater for firms under certain conditions: (1) firms that have a high 
value and whose investors have high expectations from (such as firms introduced as 
successful innovators in my first essay), and (2) firms that have a small investor base and 
are less recognized in the stock market. 
 The findings support the argument that concurrent new product announcements 
increase investor recognition. The results also reveal that the positive change in investor 
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recognition and the stock market reaction to the concurrent announcements is greater, on 
average, than that obtained from the sum of similar separate announcements.  
This dissertation makes a contribution to the literature in marketing by offering 
new insight into how investors’ assess firms’ innovation output. The essays highlight the 
importance of managing the timing and sequence of new product announcements, as 
well as their effect on investors’ expectations and recognition. From a methodology 
standpoint, the findings suggest a need to revisit the interpretation of the results of event 
studies on stock market returns to new product announcements. This dissertation also 
suggests a way in which a well-established technique, namely, the Propensity Score 
Matching method, can be leveraged to study the effects of corporate announcements.  
While the results for both essays are derived in the context of new product 
announcements, many of their findings can be extended to a broader class of events. The 
research framework of the first essay can be applied to investigating investors’ 
expectations that are formed as a result of other marketing actions undertaken by firms. 
Similarly, the methodology proposed in the second essay can be used to study the effect 
of other concurrently announced marketing actions of the firm.  
Additionally, the results of this dissertation provide helpful insight to managers 
on how to interpret investors’ reaction to their new product announcements and how to 
evaluate the value of their innovation. The results also help managers strategically 
decide when and how to leverage concurrent new product announcements in order to 
increase firm’s visibility in the stock market, surpass investors’ expectation and grow 
their investor base. 
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CHAPTER II  
DIMINISHING RETURNS TO NEW PRODUCT ANNOUNCEMENTS: HOW 
THE PAST SHAPES INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS OF THE FUTURE 
 
Research shows that innovation raises the market value of firms. However, if 
firms are active innovators, investors’ expectations of such firms’ future innovative 
output will increase. These expectations should cause an ex-ante increase in stock prices 
and a smaller ex-post market reaction when an actual new product is announced.  
I propose a theoretical framework of firm and industry characteristics that 
influence the formation of investor expectations of events that are part of a corporate 
strategy. I empirically test this framework using a sample of 4,898 new product 
announcements made by 833 publicly traded US firms. The results show that the stock 
market reaction to a new product announcement is negatively related to (1) the number 
of new products previously announced by the firm, (2) the number of new products 
previously announced by the firm’s competitors, and (3) the average sentiment of past 
public news issued by the firm. These same three factors are also positively related to the 
market value of the firm measured immediately prior to each new announcement, 
controlling for increases in firm value directly attributable to past new product 
announcements.  
The findings suggest that inferences from event studies that examine a special 
class of events - recurrent events or events that are part of a firm’s broader strategy - 
need to take into account investors’ expectations of future occurrences of these events. 
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The results also suggest that innovation’s impact on firm value is best measured in the 
long term. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is universally quoted as an imperative for firm survival and growth. 
Hundreds of articles and books provide advice on how to organize for innovation. 
Academics urge managers to pursue “unrelenting innovation” (Tellis 2013). And, 
innovation is associated with an increase in the market value of innovating firms (e.g., 
Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Pauwels et al. 2004; Sood and Tellis 2009; 
Sorescu 2012).  
Given the known benefits of innovation, it is surprising that investors do not 
always respond positively to new product announcements, even when these products 
are well received in the market place. For example, one industry analyst observes that 
“Apple routinely sees its stock price take a beating every time it unveils a new product” 
(Duncan 2011). Another analyst recounts “Nokia CEO Stephen Elop took the stage to 
unveil two important new Lumia phones powered by Microsoft’s new Windows Phone 
8 OS. Despite positive reviews of the hardware, the stock collapsed by 16%” 
(Umiastowski 2012).  
What, then, should we infer from negative stock reactions to the introduction of 
certain new products? Do these products destroy shareholder value? Are investors 
unable to assess their value-added? In this essay I propose another explanation, namely, 
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that stock market expectations are higher for more successful innovators1. These 
expectations are built into higher pre-announcement stock prices, leading to lower 
announcement-day returns.  
This essay builds on the findings of Sood and Tellis (2009), who show a 
negative relationship between announcement-day returns and the quantity of 
information released about a product prior to its formal introduction. I argue that even 
in the absence of such product-specific information prior to the announcement, the 
returns on the day of the announcement can still be affected by investors’ expectations 
of the firm’s overall innovation strategy. Indeed, the stock market can reasonably 
expect a level of innovation activity to occur through time, particularly for firms with 
an established pattern of innovation and stock prices should already reflect these 
expectations by the time the new product is announced. Therefore, announcement-day 
returns will not capture the product’s stand-alone contribution to firm value, but only 
the value of the unexpected information conveyed by the announcement. Viewed in this 
context, a negative stock return associated with a new product announcement means 
that the value-added of the product is lower than expected, not necessarily that the 
product has a negative net present value..  
A common methodological approach used in the business academic literature to 
evaluate corporate actions is the short-term event study methodology (Brown and 
Warner 1985). The value of a corporate action is measured using Cumulative Abnormal 
                                               
1 I define successful innovators as firms that introduce new products more frequently and the 
announcements of these new products have been received by investors favorably. 
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stock Returns (CARs), computed as the difference between the actual stock returns and 
the expected returns that would have occurred in the absence of the event. Returns are 
typically measured over three- to five-day event windows around the announcement 
date. This methodology implicitly assumes that expected information is already 
incorporated in pre-announcement stock prices. Therefore, inferences drawn from the 
sign and magnitude of announcement-day CARs depend on how pre-announcement 
expectations are formed. 
Accounting for pre-event expectations is a critical step to correctly interpret 
results from short-term event studies. However, as I will show below, this step is not 
always followed in the literature. To understand why, consider the entire spectrum of 
corporate events, classified in terms of pre-event information available to investors. The 
expectations formation process is usually clear towards the edges of this spectrum, but 
tends to be more subdued for events that fall in the middle. Event studies for this latter 
class tend to be more difficult to interpret. 
At one end of this expectations spectrum is the class of events that are 
completely unanticipated. Here, the theory of Rational Expectations predicts that the 
entire value-added is revealed through CARs on the day of the announcement, so the 
sign and magnitude of CARs are sufficient to draw inferences about the economic 
implications of the underlying corporate action. For instance, the first mention of a 
firm’s intention to adopt the Internet as a new channel is an unanticipated event 
(Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002). A positive announcement-day CAR can be 
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interpreted as a signal that investors anticipate positive future cash flows as a result of 
this channel expansion. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the class of events whose timing and content 
are always anticipated. Earnings announcements are a good example since they are 
usually preceded by several salient and publicly-available forecasts. The date of the 
next earnings release is known in advance and market observers on the announcement 
day are known to focus on only the difference between the actual and expected 
earnings. CARs measured on the announcement day are understood to capture only this 
unexpected component of earnings (MacKinlay 1997). 
The case of new product announcements falls somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum. If there is no leakage of information, the first time the market learns of a new 
product, is on the day it is launched. Unlike earning announcements, there are no pre-
established announcement dates that occur at regular time intervals. Yet, it would be 
difficult to argue that investors form no expectations about a firm’s new product 
pipeline. And, these expectations need not to be too specific (down to the level of 
launch time and product characteristics) in order to impact stock prices. For instance, 
investors might not know precisely when Procter & Gamble will launch its next product 
or what that new product might be, but would nevertheless expect the firm to continue 
to launch successful new products in the future at a somewhat expected pace and 
quality. 
I argue that new product announcements are a special class of anticipated 
events, one where expectations pertain to a firm’s broader innovation strategy rather 
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than to event-specific details. As firms engage in innovative activities—which can vary 
in frequency and quality—investors receive the information that is released gradually 
from the firm, form expectations about future innovation and incorporate them into 
stock prices. As a result, a firm that is expected to innovate more and better, should 
have higher market value even before its next product is launched. In this case, the 
announcement serves primarily as an opportunity for investors to update their beliefs 
about the firm’s innovation strategy. 
Therefore, CARs to new product announcements—and by extension to any 
other corporate announcements that belong to a broader corporate strategy—should be 
interpreted differently from CARs measured around announcements that are truly 
unanticipated. While this appears to be a straightforward implication of the efficient 
market hypothesis, a review of event studies published in two leading marketing 
journals reveals that inferences drawn from average event CARs do not always account 
for pre-event expectations.  
I present in the Appendix, findings from several event studies published in the 
Journal of Marketing Research and the Journal of Marketing during the past ten years. 
These papers cover events that occur repeatedly over time (such as outsourcing 
partnerships, alliances, or preannouncements) and likely belong to broader corporate 
strategies. One hypothesis from each study is selected, the authors’ interpretation of the 
empirical findings is quoted, and a plausible alternative explanation that accounts for 
pre-event expectations is presented in the Appendix. Although these authors have 
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correctly applied the event study methodology, their inferences and conclusions appear 
to assume that the events they study are substantially unanticipated.  
For example, Karniouchina, Uslay, and Erenburg (2011) interpret the 
insignificant CARs surrounding product placements in movies as a sign that this 
marketing strategy has become ineffective. Yet, many brands in their sample have 
appeared in multiple movies. It is reasonable to assume that Coca-Cola, whose brands 
appears 75 times in their sample, and has been one of the iconic symbols of American 
life that has been featuring in movies since 1916, faces higher expectations for placing 
products, vending machines, or billboards in movies. If so, investors might not react to 
Coca-Cola placements announcements even if the underlying movie placement strategy 
has positive effects on firm value.  
The list in the Appendix is necessarily short due to space limitations. However, 
I have identified additional studies in the literature with similar limitations (see, e.g., 
Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich 2007; Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan 2007; 
Oxley, Sampson, and Silverman 2009). In addition, a few authors calculate the net 
present value of new products (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003), new ventures (Rao, 
Chandy, and Prabhu 2008), or new product alliances (Kalaignanam, Shankar, and 
Varadarajan 2007) using the stock market reaction to the announcement of these events, 
without explicitly acknowledging that the measured value pertains to only the 
unanticipated component of these announcements. Given the many calls to demonstrate 
accountability for marketing managers, academics should strive to minimize instances 
 11 
 
in which the value of marketing goes unrecognized, or is misstated (Rust et al. 2004; 
Stewart 2009). 
 In this essay, I propose a set of characteristics that help shape investors’ 
expectations about a firm’s product innovation strategy and identify three factors that 
contribute to these expectations: (1) the number of new products previously announced 
by the firm, (2) the number of new products previously announced by the firm’s 
competitors, and (3) the average sentiment of past public news issued by the firm.  
I then empirically test the proposal using a large sample of new product 
announcements across industries. I first show that the three proposed factors are 
positively related to the firm’s market value, measured immediately prior to a new 
product announcement. I do so while controlling for the product-specific information 
available prior to the event and for the extent to which the firm’s past product 
announcements have exceeded investors’ expectations. Second, I show that the three 
expectation factors are negatively related to announcement-date returns, consistent with 
the notion that these returns only measure an update from previously-set expectations. 
To corroborate this conclusion I perform a final test by measuring the long-term stock 
performance of firms in the sample in relation to their unexpected innovation output. 
Not surprisingly, I find a positive relationship between performance and output—the 
opposite of what is found in the case of announcement-day CARs. While active 
innovating firms have lower announcement-day CARs, they also tend to have higher 
returns over the long term. 
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This essay makes three contributions to theory and practice. First, from a 
conceptual standpoint, it emphasizes the importance of interpreting event-date CARs in 
the context of broader corporate strategies where investors could use past information 
to form expectations about the future, even when this information is not explicitly 
attached to the corporate event being studied. And, for the case of new product 
announcements, it identifies specific factors that contribute to these expectations. While 
the focus of this essay is on new products, similar theoretical frameworks can be 
developed for other strategies such as the choice of alliance partners, the acquisition 
and disposal of brands, brand licensing and placement decisions, or market expansions.  
Second, this research contributes to the literature that studies stock market 
reactions to new product announcements by showing that firms that are active 
innovators, firms that perform in innovative industries, and well-performing firms have 
smaller announcement-day reactions but higher market values before the 
announcement. In doing so I highlight differences between the short- and long-term 
effects of innovation on firm value. 
Third, the result that frequent innovators have higher increases in long-term 
market value has important implications for how publicly-traded firms should evaluate 
the performance of their marketing managers. A focus on short-term stock performance 
could create sub-optimal incentives, including a disincentive to maintain a fast pace of 
product introductions. Indeed, recent evidence shows that managers are preoccupied by 
how they can time product introductions in order to maximize the value of their stock 
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holdings (Moorman et al. 2012). Governing boards should, therefore, deemphasize 
short-term performance metrics and focus instead on longer-term returns to innovation.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
New product announcements are manifestations of a firm’s innovation strategy. 
To preserve competitive advantage, firms do not typically articulate the objectives of 
their innovation strategy, nor do they reveal how they plan to deploy it. Nevertheless, a 
wealth of information is available to anyone wishing to learn about the strategy. 
Investors can infer a firm’s future innovation output by observing the effectiveness of 
the firm’s prior innovations, accounting for the competitive landscape of the firm’s 
industry. I propose here three factors that shape this expectation-formation process: (1) 
the number of new products previously announced by the innovating firm, (2) the 
number of new products previously announced by the firm’s competitors, and (3) the 
average sentiment of past public news affecting the innovating firm. 
I do not claim that these three factors are exhaustive. Rather, following a review 
of event studies of new product announcements, presented in Table 1, I view them as 
plausible, measurable indicators of pre-announcement expectations. These factors are 
grounded in theory and are supported by recent research on competitive repertoires, 
which shows that expectations about strategy deployment depend on how much the 
strategy is emphasized and  how well it has previously been implemented (e.g., Ferrier 
and Lee 2002; Rindova, Ferrier, and Wiltbank 2010).  
Next I provide a detailed justification of the three expectation factors.  
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TABLE 1 
Overview of Event Study Literature in the Area of New Product Announcements 
 
Paper Sample Size 
Sample 
period 
Average CAR  
Woolridge and 
Snow (1990) 
241 new product introduction 
announcements and 52 unrelated 
R&D project announcements 
June 1972-
Dec 1987 
.69% for new product 
announcements (p<.01) 
1.13% for R&D announcements (p-
value NSa) 
Chaney, Devinney, 
and Winer (1991) 
1101  1975-1984 .25% (p<.05) 
Kelm, Narayanan, 
and Pinches (1995) 
197 R&D announcements and 
304 new product 
commercialization 
announcements 
1977-1989 
.88% for R&D announcements 
(p<.01) 
1.02% for new product 
commercialization announcements 
(p<.001)  
Zantout and 
Chaganti (1996) 
108  1975-1992 1.15% (p<.01) 
Koku, Jagpal, and 
Viswanath (1997) 
334 new product 
preannouncements and 301 new 
product announcements 
1980-1989 
.306% for announcements (p-value 
NS) 
.430% for preannouncements (P<.01) 
Lee et al. (2000) 
24 original new product 
announcements, 53 
announcements of new product 
imitations 
1975-1990 
Results range from non-significant 
for the overall sample to a 2.17% 
return for the sub-sample of original 
new announcements (p<.05) for the 
(-1,1) window 
Chen et al. (2002) 384  1991-1995 .59% (p=.002) 
Sharma and Lacey 
(2004) 
344 FDA approval of new drugs 
and 41 FDA rejections 
__ 
1.56% for FDA approvals (p<.005)  
-21.03% for FDA rejections (p<.005) 
Sorescu, Shankar, 
and Kushwaha 
(2007) 
419  1984-2000 
Pre-announcements: .59% (p-value 
NS) 
Chen (2008) 794 1989-1999 1.24%  (p<.01) 
Sood and Tellis 
(2009) 
5481 announcements related to 
various stages of innovation, from 
funding an alliances to launch and 
awards 
1977-2006 .5% (p<.001) 
Lee and Chen 
(2009) 
409 new product 
preannouncements and 
announcements 
1990-1998 
3.96%  (p<.001) on day (-1) , 1.02% 
(p<.001) on day zero, and -.3% 
(p<.05) on day (+1)  
Wang, Chen, and 
Chang (2011) 
3061  1997-2005 .194% (p=.004) 
Ba et al. (2013) 
261 announcements of green 
vehicle innovations 
1996-2009 .45% (p<.05) 
Borah and Tellis 
(2014) 
441 announcements of "make" - 
in house new product 
announcements 
07/01/2002-
06/30/2007 
.25% for the "make" subsample, 
(p<.01) 
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The new product announcement history of the firm 
Events that underline the recent implementation of a firm’s strategy are among 
the most important indicators of the future deployment of that strategy. In this essay’s 
context, firms with frequent new product introductions boost investors’ expectations of 
their future innovative output, increasing their stock market value along the way. The 
announcement of a new product introduction is largely a confirmation of these 
expectations, leading to a smaller stock market reaction when compared to firms that 
are not expected to innovate. This factor has two separate effects on firm value 
measured immediately before the new product announcement. The first is a direct effect 
resulting from the information conveyed through the CARs associated with past new 
product announcements. Because these CARs have been shown to be positive, on 
average (Table 1), this effect produces a mechanical positive relationship between firm 
value before the announcement and the number of past products launched. The second 
effect—the one studied in this essay—is the indirect effect of past new products on firm 
value, which operates through increased expectations about the future. Because my 
focus is on the latter, I filter out the mechanical effect by controlling for the sum of 
CARs measured around past product announcements.  
Although Chaney, Devinney, and Winer (1991) document a similar negative 
effect of number of past new products on event-date CARs, the literature as a whole 
lacks consensus in empirical findings. Table 1 shows that this effect ranges from 
positive (e.g., Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches 1995), to non-significant (e.g., Lee and 
Chen 2009), to negative (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991). I argue that the 
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dual empirical test in this essay- which use both Tobin’s Q and CARs as dependent 
variables - provide more conclusive evidence that the negative effect of past new 
products on CARs is driven by pre-event expectations. Ceteris paribus, I hypothesize 
that: 
H1a: The more new product announcements a firm has made in its recent past, 
the higher its market value measured immediately before a new product 
announcement. 
H1b: The more new product announcements a firm has made in its recent past, 
the lower the stock market reaction to its new product announcements. 
 
The new product announcement history of the firm’s competitors 
Firms do not innovate in a vacuum. When investors form beliefs about a firm’s 
future innovation output they are also likely to learn from product announcements 
made by other firms in the same industry. While two prior studies have accounted for 
the presence of competition or industry concentration when measuring the stock 
market reaction to new product introductions (Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu 2008; Lee et 
al. 2000), these studies focus on the effect of competition on economic rents, rather 
than its effect on expectation formation.  
I argue that the bar is set higher for firms in innovative industries, where 
effective innovation is almost a prerequisite for survival. These firms often ride waves 
of technological advances in the industry and benefit from investors’ excitement about 
new technological developments at the industry level. When these firms do innovate, 
they have a daunting task in cutting through highly competitive clutter. As a result, 
higher expectations of innovativeness are built into the stock prices of firms that 
operate in innovative industries. Thus, I hypothesize: 
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H2a: The more new product announcements a firm’s competitors have made in 
their recent past, the higher the market value of the firm measured immediately 
before it makes a new product announcement. 
H2b: The more new product announcements a firm’s competitors have made in 
their recent past, the lower the stock market reaction to the firm’s new product 
announcement. 
 
Another possibility is that in innovative industries where too many new 
products are already introduced by competitors, there exists a higher competition for 
the target firm’s new product. Investors might expect a bigger challenge for the firm’s 
new product to be successful and therefore expect a lower NPV for the product. 
Consequently, the stock market returns to the firm’s new product announcement will 
be lower. Therefore, I still predict a negative relationship between the frequency of 
firm’s competitors’ new product and the stock return to firm’s new product 
announcement similar to proposed H2b. However, if investors are expecting a 
challenging market for the new product and subsequently a lower cash flow for the 
firm’s future product, there should be no positive effects incorporated in firm value 
before the introduction of the product. In fact, the more firm’s competitors announce 
new products (before firm’s new product announcement), the more pessimistic the 
investors should become about the firm’s new product performance in the highly 
competitive market and this should negatively affect firm value before the new 
product announcement. Therefore, we should observe that: 
  HA2a: The more new product announcements a firm’s competitors have made in 
their recent past, the lower the market value of the firm measured immediately 
before it makes a new product announcement. 
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Past news sentiment 
The last factor is viewed as a proxy for the overall investor assessment of a 
firm’s ability to compete effectively. A positive news sentiment, as captured by a 
series of predominately favorable public news about the firm, implies that the firm has 
recently exceled in many areas of activity. Furthermore, investors’ perceived 
effectiveness of firms’ corporate actions is likely to have a spillover effect on all other 
activities of the firm. Therefore, the investors might assume that because the firm has 
done well in the past, and in other areas, they might do well in their future innovation 
activities as well. Consequently, investors are more likely to have high expectations 
from well-managed firms that are prominently featured in the news for doing things 
right. As a result, these firms should have higher market values and any additional 
positive news about them is likely to elicit smaller stock market reactions than in the 
case of less successful firm. This leads to the last set of hypotheses:  
H3a: The more positive the news sentiment associated with a firm’s recent 
actions, the higher its market value measured immediately before a new product 
announcement. 
H3b: The more positive the news sentiment associated with a firm’s recent 
actions, the lower the stock market reaction to its new product announcements. 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Testing the hypotheses requires a large sample of new product announcements 
across multiple industries. Most event studies of corporate announcements have used 
archival searches in Dow Jones, LexisNexis, or Wall Street Journal Index to identify the 
news (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Sood and Tellis 2009; Sorescu, 
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Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; Wang, Chen, and Chang 2011). This method is unwieldy 
in the context of concurrent announcements. Specifically, to prevent selection bias, a 
complete sample of corporate announcements made by the firms included in the sample 
is needed. Archival searches, which typically rely on keywords, cannot guarantee that all 
corporate announcements are retrieved.  
To overcome the challenges associated with archival searches, Icompile the 
sample from the RavenPack News Analytics database. RavenPack is a news provider 
that collects all major real-time news wires and news from other Internet sources 
including financial and business websites, such as The Wall Street Journal, Dow 
Jones, Barron’s, blogs and local and regional newspapers. Although RavenPack has 
been increasingly utilized by researchers in finance and accounting (e.g., Akbas et al. 
2016; Kelley and Tetlock 2013; Samadi 2016; Shroff et al. 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and 
Yu 2014), it has not yet been widely adopted by marketing researchers. 
RavenPack has a number of useful features. An important feature of 
RavenPack is that it categorizes and quantifies all news items according to their 
sentiment, relevance, topic, and novelty. Among these variables I am particularly 
interested in the categorization of news items by type. RavenPack classifies all 
corporate news into specific categories such as product releases, acquisitions, award 
announcements, executive appointments and other similar categories. Within these 
categories, I focus on news categorized as “product release,” defined by RavenPack as 
news item where “the company launches a new product or service or an upgrade to 
an existing one.” Therefore, the sample in this study is the totality of news items 
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classified as “product release” by RavenPack.  
I obtain from RavenPack all new product announcements made by publicly 
traded U.S. corporations between January 2007 and December 2011. The structure of 
the database requires that a number of filters be applied to obtain a clean, usable 
sample for this research. Using classifications provided by RavenPack I retain in the 
sample news items categorized as “press releases” ascribed to the “product release” 
category. I further ensure that the announcement is correctly ascribed to the specific 
parent company (and not by another entity which may tangentially refer to the parent 
firm in one of its press releases). RavenPack provides a “relevance score” between 0 
and 100 to address the source of announcements. A relevance score of 100 is always 
ascribed to the firm issuing the announcement, whereas a lower relevance score may 
be assigned to a competitor marginally referenced in the announcement. I also use the 
“novelty score” provided by RavenPack, which captures the newness of the content of 
each news story. I retain only announcements coded as “product releases” that have a 
novelty score of 100, as these represent the first mention of the product to appear in 
any news outlet within a 24-hour time window. This ensures that there is no duplicate 
announcements in the sample, since some press releases may appear in multiple news 
wire services. Later in this section I describe how I used archival searches to collect 
earlier information about these announcements, if such information was available. 
After applying these filters a tentative sample of 9,776 press releases is 
obtained that are classified as new product announcements and are made by 1,600 US 
firms in 64 industries (defined as two-digit SIC codes), from January 2007 to 
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December 2011.  
Sample validation and content analysis 
I perform a detailed content analysis to validate the sample. I do so for two 
reasons. First, the robustness tests require that I control for pre-event information 
specific to each product and the “novelty score” variable in RavenPack only looks back 
24 hours. Therefore, I search for any information about the product that might have 
preceded the new product announcement date obtained from RavenPack. Second, I 
recognize that news items in RavenPack are categorized by computer algorithms that 
classify announcements as “product releases,” and that such algorithms are subject to 
error. If these errors are random, they would merely introduce noise in the CARs 
measured around new product announcements. However, if the algorithm 
systematically misclassifies events with mostly positive sentiments (or mostly negative 
sentiment) as “product releases,” the errors could introduce bias into some of the 
estimators.  
Checks for earlier mentions of products 
I begin by reading every press release in the sample to determine if it is 
correctly classified as a “product release.” I find 846 announcements (8.6%) 
misclassified as “product release” and eliminate them from the sample. I then content 
analyze the remaining 8,930 announcements and find that 1,503 of them (16.8%) are 
pre-announcements of future new products, where the introduction is planned at least 
one week into the future. The remaining announcements are of actual product 
introductions. I also find that 1,101 announcements (12.3%) refer to multiple products 
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or to multiple versions of the same product, and I control for these characteristics in the 
empirical analysis.  
Next, I conduct Factiva searches for each new product to search for earlier 
information about the product. I find that 1,510 announcements (16.9%) refer to 
products that had been previously mentioned in news wires, blogs, or other press 
sources. 
As a last step, in order to eliminate confounding events I drop all product 
announcements for which the parent firm issues one or more press releases during the 
five-day [-2, +2] announcement window. This follows common practice in published 
event studies (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2014; Lee and Chen 2009; Lee et al. 2000; 
Wooldrige and Snow 1990). 
Additional sample validation 
I also consider the reverse-type error, namely that RavenPack might incorrectly 
classify a new product announcement as a different type of announcement. To 
investigate this possibility I randomly select twenty firms from the subset of firms that 
according to RavenPack have made only one new product announcement. Then, I 
perform archival searches on these twenty firms to determine if new product 
announcements not reported in RavenPack could be identified through Factiva. 
Factiva searches reveal that eleven of these firms did not make any other 
announcements. Of the remaining nine, five had announced other products; however, 
because these products were announced along with confounding events they were 
eliminated from the final sample. For each of the remaining four firms I found one 
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other new product announcement during the five-year sample period. This suggests 
that the final sample is not a census of new product announcements. However, because 
I could not identify any systematic pattern common to the four missing products or the 
four firms, I conclude that the final sample appears to be representative of the entire 
census of new product announcements.  
Additional data and final sample 
To test the hypotheses financial and accounting data for firms in the sample 
are also required. I collect stock returns from CRSP and financial statement data from 
COMPUSTAT. All data is aligned at the fiscal year level.  
The final sample used in the estimation of the models consists of 4,898 new 
product announcements made by 833 firms. The 4,898 announcements are made 
between 2008 and 2011; announcements made in 2007 are used to compute rolling-
window variables that capture the history of past new product announcements. Each 
event in the final sample is subject to the following three filters: (1) I ensured, through 
content analysis, that the announcement is for a genuine new product, (2) I required 
complete availability of data for all variables in the statistical models (including R&D 
and advertising expenditures), and (3) I ensured that no confounding announcements 
are present. In addition, these remaining events have all been subject to detailed 
archival searches for earlier mentions of their products.  
 
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND METHOD 
Measures 
To test the hypotheses I develop empirical measures for the two dependent 
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variables and the three independent variables. I also include control variables that 
impact the relationship between new product announcements and firm performance. I 
discuss these measures in this section. 
First dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
The dependent variable in hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a is Tobin’s Q, 
abbreviated here as Q. I use book value of debt as a proxy for market value of debt 
and compute market value of equity as the product of the number of shares 
outstanding and the price per share. The market value of assets is computed as the 
book value of assets plus the difference between the market value of equity and the 
book value of equity. Q is then computed as the ratio of the market value of assets to 
the book value of assets, as shown in Equation (1).  
Tobin’s Q = [(Book value of total assets) + (Common shares outstanding × 
Stock price) – (Book value of common stocks)] / (Book value of 
the total assets)                                                                    (1) 
Because Q should measure firm value as close as possible to the announcement 
date, the right-hand-side variables in Equation (1) must be those that were available to 
investors on the day before the announcement window. Two of these variables (book 
value of assets and book value of equity) are obtained from annual accounting 
statements. The other two (number of shares outstanding and price per share) are 
available daily in CRSP. Thus, to estimate Q I use accounting data from the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the new announcement, and stock market data from the trading 
day immediately preceding the beginning of the announcement window. This ensures 
that Q is not contaminated by the stock market reaction to the new product 
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announcement. The mean value of Tobin’s Q in the sample is 1.90, consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco 2009; Morgan and Rego 2009; Sorescu and 
Spanjol 2008). 
Second dependent variable: CAR 
The dependent variable in hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b is the stock market 
reaction to new product announcements, obtained through a short-term event study. 
Within the innovation literature, event studies have been commonly used to assess the 
stock market reaction to announcements of new product introductions (Borah and 
Tellis 2014; Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991), new product preannouncements 
(Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), new product introduction delays (Hendricks 
and Singhal 1997), and the introduction of new products by competitors (Chen, Ho, 
and Ik 2005).  
I use the market-adjusted returns to estimate the reaction to the introduction of 
new products (Brown and Warner 1985). Specifically, I estimate abnormal returns 
associated with each product announcement as follows: 
ARit= Rit – Rmt                                                                          (2)  
where ARit is the abnormal return of firm i on day t, Rit is the daily return of firm i on 
day t, and Rmt is the return of the stock market index on day t. 
I then compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), by cumulating the daily 
abnormal returns over a time window from t1 to t2, which includes the announcement 
day: 
CAR (t1, t2) = ∑ ARt2t=t1 it              (3)  
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For robustness, I also compute abnormal returns using the Fama-French-Carhart 
four-factor model, which augments the market model with three additional risk factors 
that have been shown to explain the cross-section of stock returns (see Carhart 1997; 
Fama and French 1993): 
ARit = Rit – (α̂ + β̂ Rmt + γ̂ SMBt + δ̂ HMLt + λ̂ UMDt)   (4) 
where Rit and Rmt are as previously defined, SMBt is the return differential between 
portfolios of small and large market capitalization stocks, HMLt is the return differential 
between portfolios of high- and low-book-to-market ratio stocks, and UMDt is the 
momentum factor computed as the return differential between portfolios of high- and 
low-prior-return stocks. 
To choose the appropriate length of the event window I compute CARs for 
several windows, beginning with two days before the announcement and ending two 
days after the announcement, and test their significance in each window. In line with 
previous studies (e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Swaminathan and 
Moorman 2009) I select the window with the largest t-statistic: [t-2, t+2]. 
Independent variables 
The new product announcement history of the firm (Firm_NPA): I compute from 
RavenPack the sum of prior new product announcements made by the firm over rolling 
windows of twelve months preceding each announcement (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991; Sood and Tellis 2009). 
The new product announcement history of a firm’s competitors 
(Competitors_NPA): I measure competitors’ history of new product announcements as 
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the total number of announcements made by firm’s competitors, divided by the number 
of all of the competitors in the same three-digit SIC code. Again, I use rolling windows 
of twelve months preceding each announcement. This measure captures the average 
innovation activity among competitors while effectively controlling for industry size.  
Average past news sentiment (News_Sentiment): Past news sentiment is 
measured using the Event Sentiment Score (ESS) variable from RavenPack. This score 
measures the valence of the news. The strength of the score is set by a computer 
algorithm using a coding system established by experts who have classified entity-
specific events and determined if these events generally convey positive or negative 
sentiment to investors and to what degree they do so. ESS ranges from 0 to 100, where 
values above 50 indicate a more positive sentiment, while values below 50 denote a 
more negative sentiment. A score of 50 shows that the news is neutral, in the sense that 
it is believed to not influence the firm’s future cash flows2. ESS scores are averaged 
across all news items about the firm published during the twelve months preceding 
each new product announcement. These news items include all event types, not just the 
new product announcements. Therefore, if a firm has a high average past news 
sentiment it indicates that the majority of firm’s activities that have been announced 
                                               
2 According to details provided by RavenPack, The ESS score is based on ratings that have been obtained 
from a panel of experts with extensive professional backgrounds in finance and economics. These experts 
were asked to evaluate over 2000 types of corporate events for their content. The ratings obtained from the 
training sample are encapsulated in an algorithm that is used to evaluate the content of each new event and 
generate a score for it. The algorithm uses additional information including ratings scales from all major 
brokerage firms, investment banks, and credit rating agencies. RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score has 
been utilized in recent research in finance in a manner similar to ours (e.g., Akbas et al. 2016; Kelley and 
Tetlock 2013). 
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publicly were perceived favorably by the investors. 
Control variables 
Past innovation surprises (Past_Surprises): Earlier in this essay I have 
discussed the importance of controlling for the direct effect on firm value resulting 
from the information conveyed through the CARs associated with past new product 
announcements. I measure the average CARs of past new product announcements 
made by the firm during the twelve-month period preceding each announcement, 
computed over the [t-2, t+2] window surrounding each announcement, using the 
market-adjusted model described previously.  
Change in firm value attributed to past product announcements 
(Total_Past_Surprises): I sum up the CARs of all past new product announcements 
made in the rolling twelve-month window preceding each announcement. I use this 
variable in the Tobin’s Q regressions to control for the effect of previous new product 
announcements that have been already incorporated in the stock price of the firm and 
subsequently in Tobin’s Q. 
Firm size (Firm_Size): I use the logarithm of the book value of assets to control 
for the effect of firm size on abnormal returns. This is standard practice in event studies 
since large firms typically have smaller percentage changes in their stock prices (e.g., 
Boyd, Chandy and Cunha 2010; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008). 
Firm advertising intensity (Advertising): I compute advertising intensity as the 
ratio of advertising expenditures to book value of assets and use it as a control variable 
in both the Q and the CAR model. Advertising intensity has been previously linked to 
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both Tobin’s Q and CARs to new product announcements (e.g. Joshi and Hanssens 
2010; Wang, Chen, and Chang 2011). The higher the advertising expenditures, the 
more a firm can support and promote its new products. 
Firm R&D intensity (R&D): I compute R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to book value of assets and use it as a control variable in both models. 
R&D intensity has been previously linked to both Q (Krasnikov, Mishra and Orozco 
2009) and CARs to new product announcements (Lee and Chen 2009).  
Industry R&D intensity (Industry_R&D): Industry R&D intensity is defined as 
the R&D expenditures summed across all firms in the same three-digit SIC industry 
divided by the sum of these firms’ book value of assets. I use this variable as control in 
both the Tobin’s Q and the CAR model (Chen 2008).  
Leverage (Leverage): I compute leverage as the ratio of the book value of long-
term debt to the book value of assets. Leverage tends to magnify CARs and is 
frequently used as a control variable in event studies (e.g., Homburg et al 2014). 
Book to market (Book_to_Market): The ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity is used to control for expectations included in the market value of equity 
that are not captured by the three expectation factors. 
Sales growth (Sales_Growth): I use the percentage growth in sales from the 
previous year to control for the firm’s past performance (e.g., Homburg et al 2014). 
Herfindahl index (HHI): I compute the Herfindahl index as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of all firms in each three-digit SIC code. Herfindahl index 
is used to control for industry concentration, which can potentially reduce rents to 
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innovation (Lee and Chen 2009). 
T-bill average (T_Bill): Following Chaney, Devinney, and Winer (1991) I use 
the annual average rate of the 90-day Treasury bill in the CAR model to control for the 
possibility that CARs may vary through time due to changing economic conditions. 
Earlier mention (Early_Mention): I construct a dummy variable whose value is 
equal to one if information about the new product has been available to investors prior 
to the formal announcement and zero otherwise. CARs to announcements with prior 
information available should be smaller than CARs to announcements that contain the 
first mention of a product in any news source (Sood and Tellis 2009). Likewise, since 
this prior information is incorporated into firm value when it becomes available, 
Tobin’s Q should be positively related to the availability of earlier information for each 
product. 
Announcement-specific variables: From the content analysis of the RavenPack 
data I create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the announcement is an 
introduction and zero if it is a preannouncement (Introduction). I also compute a second 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the announcement is about multiple products and 
zero if it is about a single product (Multiple). Finally, I count the number of words in 
each announcement (Word_Count) to account for the possibility that firms use longer 
press releases to introduce more promising products.  
A summary of the operationalization is provided in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Variables and Data Sources for New Product Announcements (2007-2011) 
 
 Conceptual variable Measured Variable Data Source 
Dependent 
Variables 
Short-term cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) 
Cumulative abnormal return (two days 
before to two days after the announcement) 
computed using the market adjusted model 
and the four factor model 
CRSP, Fama 
French Factors 
from WRDS 
Tobin’s Q  
(Tobin) 
Tobin’s Q of the firm measured 3 days prior 
to the new product announcement  
Merged CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
Independent 
Variables 
The new product 
announcement history of 
the firm (Firm_NPA) 
Number of the new product announcements 
made by the firm during the 12 months 
before the event 
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
The new product 
announcement history of 
the firm’s competitors 
(Competitors_NPA)  
Number of new product announcements 
made by the firm’s competitors divided by 
the number of all firms in the 3-digit SIC 
code, during the 12 months before the event  
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
Past news sentiment 
(News_Sentiment) 
Average of event sentiment score (ESS) for 
all the firm’s news published 12 months 
prior to the event  
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
Control 
Variables 
Past innovation surprises 
(Past_Surprises) 
 
Average of CARs for all the firm’s new 
product announcements made within 12 
months prior to the event 
CRSP 
Change in firm value 
attributed to past product 
announcements 
(Total_Past_Surprises) 
Sum of the CARs to new product 
announcements made within 12 months 
prior to the event 
CRSP 
Firm Size (Firm_Size) Natural logarithm of total assets COMPUSTAT 
Firm Advertising 
Intensity (Advertising) 
Ratio between a firm’s advertising 
expenditures and its assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Firm R&D Intensity 
(R&D) 
Ratio between a firm’s R&D expenditures 
and its assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Industry R&D Intensity 
(Industry_R&D) 
Ratio of the sum of the R&D expenditures 
across all firms in the 3-digit SIC code to 
the sum of their assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Leverage (Leverage) 
Ratio of long term book debt to the firm’s 
total assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Book to market 
(Book_to_Market) 
Ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity 
COMPUSTAT 
Sales growth 
(Sales_Growth) 
Percentage growth in sales from the 
previous year 
COMPUSTAT 
Herfindahl Index (HHI):  
Sum of the squares of the market shares of 
all firms in the 3-digit SIC code. 
COMPUSTAT 
T-bill average (T_Bill) 
Annual average of the 90-day Treasury bill 
rate in the year of the announcement 
CRSP Daily 
Treasuries 
Earlier mention of an 
announcement 
(Early_Mention) 
Dummy=1 if information about the new 
product had been available to investors prior 
to the announcement 
Factiva and 
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
Introduction 
(Introduction) 
Dummy=1 if the announcement refers to an 
introduction, 0 if preannouncement 
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
Multiple (Multiple) 
Dummy=1 if the announcement refers to 
multiple products, 0 if single product 
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
Announcement word 
count (Word_Count) 
Number of words in the press release 
RavenPack 
News Analytics 
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Model development 
To test hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a I estimate the following model: 
TobinQit =β0 + β1Firm_NPAit + β2Competitors_NPAit + β3News_Sentimentit + 
+β4Total_Past_Surprisesit + β5Firm_Sizeit + β6Advertisingit + 
β7R&Dit+ +β8Industry_R&Dit + β9Sales_Growthit + β10Leverageit+ 
β11HHIkt+ +β12T_Billt +β13Early_Mentionit + Σβ14kDummy_SICkt + 
+μi + εit                     (5) 
 
For hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b I estimate the following model: 
CARit = α0 + α1 Firm_NPAit + α2 Competitors_NPAit+ α3 News_sentimentit + 
+α4Past_Surprisesit + α5 Firm_Sizeit + α6 Advertisingit + α7 R&Dit+ 
+α8Industry_R&Dit + α9 Book_to_Marketit + α10 Sales_Growthit + 
+α11Leverageit+ α12 HHIkt +α13 T_Billt + α14 Early_Mentionit + 
+α15Introductionit + α16Multipleit + α17 Word_Countit + 
+ Σα18kDummy_SICik +μi + ε’it                           (6) 
where, in both cases, i denotes the firm, t denotes the time (the day before the CAR 
measurement window for Tobin’s Q and the day of the announcement for CAR), k is an 
industry dummy and the other variables are as previously defined.  
 
RESULTS  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics computed over the January 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2011 period. As mentioned earlier, data from the year 2007 was used to 
compute the rolling window variables measured over the year preceding each 
announcement (past new product announcements, past competitors’ announcements, 
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past news sentiment, and past surprises). 
The CARs are significantly positive across sample (+.39% for the market-
adjusted model, p<.01, +.31% for the four factor model, p<.01), confirming findings 
from the previous literature summarized in Table 1. The CARs are also significantly 
positive for the announcement date (+.17% for the market-adjusted model, p<.01, 
+.14% for the four factor model, p<.01) and for the three day window surrounding the 
announcement date (+.33% for the market-adjusted model, p<.01, +.28% for the four 
factor model, p<.01).The magnitude of CARs reported here lies at the lower end of the 
range from these prior studies. This could be due to the sample of this essay being more 
comprehensive than those used in past studies, because it includes all types of new 
product announcements across industries, ranging from product updates to more 
important innovations.  
The final sample includes 780 announcements of products for which I were able to 
determine that information was available to market participants prior to the formal 
announcement date in RavenPack; in 612 of these cases I was able to obtain a clear date of 
the first mention of the product and to compute CARs surrounding this earlier date. These 
CARs are significantly different from zero (p<.01) and are also significantly larger than 
CARs surrounding the formal announcement date. This is true for both market-adjusted 
CARs (+.77% > +.17%, p=.07) and for the four factor CARs (+.91% > +.14%, p=.03). This 
confirms the findings of Sood and Tellis (2009).  
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TABLE 3: 
 Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for New Product Announcements (2007 to 2011) 
 
 
Mean St. dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
(21
) 
Tobin (1) 1.90 1.04 1                    . 
CAR (MA) (2) .39% 6.31% -.04 1                    
CAR (Fama French) (3) .31% 6.21% -.04 .93 1                   
Firm_NPA (4) 6.10 8.73 .21 -.07 -.07 1                  
Competitors_NPA (5) 2.46 1.36 .05 -.05 -.04 .19 1                 
News_ Sentiment(6) 54.15 5.07 .01 -.04 -.03 .01 .00 1                
Past_ Surprises(7) .38% 4.24% .06 .00 .01 -.01 .00 .01 1               
Total_Past_ Surprises(8) 1.97% 15.99% .09 .00 .01 .12 .04 .00 .73 1              
Firm_Size (9)a 7.11 2.02 .08 -.08 -.07 .45 -.05 -.09 -.08 -.03 1             
R&D (10) .09 .09 .17 .03 .02 .00 .18 -.05 .06 .10 -.34 1            
Industry_ R&D (11) .06 .03 .05 -.01 -.01 .09 .25 -.01 .03 .01 -.14 .36 1           
Advertising (12) .01 .03 .00 -.03 -.04 .00 -.12 -.01 .00 .00 -.02 -.05 -.17 1          
Leverage (13) .12 .16 -.11 -.04 -.04 .00 -.11 -.03 -.04 -.05 .30 -.22 -.11 .01 1         
Sales_Growth (14) .05 .29 .23 -.02 -.02 .03 .01 .06 -.04 -.01 .07 -.04 .00 -.03 -.02 1        
HHI (15) .05 .04 -.09 .02 .03 -.09 -.11 -.02 -.02 -.02 .10 -.27 -.41 .13 .16 -.01 1       
Book_to_ Market (16) .58 .56 -.52 .03 .03 -.19 -.03 -.11 -.08 -.09 -.23 -.04 .02 .04 -.05 -.20 .04 1      
T_Bill (17) .00 .00 -.01 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.04 .06 -.04 -.07 -.05 .03 .12 .02 .05 -.04 -.02 .08 1     
Early_ Mention (18) .16 .37 .02 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 .03 .01 -.01 .04 -.03 .02 .01 -.04 .00 1    
Introduction (19) .83 .37 .01 -.01 -.02 .04 .01 -.02 -.02 -.02 .04 -.02 .00 .03 .01 .00 -.03 -.01 .02 .05 1   
Multiple (20) .13 .33 -.04 .01 .02 -.04 .00 .01 .02 .00 -.03 -.01 .04 .01 -.01 -.02 -.01 .02 .00 -.06 -.09 1  
Word_Count (21) 765.9 257.3 .11 .00 .00 .06 .06 -.06 .00 .02 .03 .17 .06 .02 -.03 .08 -.11 -.06 -.02 .02 -.05 .05 1 
a Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total assets measured in $ millions
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Test of hypotheses 
To test H1a, H2a and H3a, I estimate Equation (5) and present the results in Table 4. 
The results indicate that the count of past new product announcements (p<.05), the recent 
history of product announcements in the firm’s industry (p=.06), and the past news 
sentiment (p<.05) are all positively associated with Tobin’s Q, even after controlling for the 
sum of CARs associated with past announcements (which is also positively related to the 
Q, p<.01). This suggests that the three focal factors contribute, at least in part, to firm value 
associated with expected cash flows, rather than just being positively related to the realized 
change in market value attributable to the CARs to past announcements. According to the 
results and the marginally significance of the estimated coefficient for the recent history of 
product announcements in the firm’s industry, although both counteracting mechanisms 
introduced in H2a and HA2a might be at work, the argument in H2a is more plausible. 
In line with prior research I also find that firm R&D intensity and sales growth are 
positively related to Tobin’s Q (p<.01). While sales growth can be more directly linked to 
cash flows that have already accrued to the firm, R&D expenditures could also carry 
information relevant for assessing firms’ future innovation prospects. 
To test H1b, H2b, and H3b, I estimate Equation (6) and present the results in Table 5. 
The first column in Table 5 shows the results with CARs computed using the market-
adjusted, estimated over the entire sample of 4,898 observations. The second column 
repeats the analysis for CARs computed with the Fama-French model. In the third and 
fourth columns the same models are estimated over the sample that excludes the 780 
product announcements for which earlier information was available. Thus, these last two 
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columns present results for the subsample of announcements that were likely not 
anticipated in a direct manner, but could be anticipated indirectly, through inferences drawn 
from firms’ past activities.  
 
 
TABLE 4 
Determinants of Tobin’s Q Immediately before the Announcement of New 
Products 
 
 
DV: Tobin’s Q 
N=4,898 
Firm_NPA  .007 (.003)** 
Competitors_NPA  .036 (.019)* 
News_ Sentiment .007 (.003)** 
Total_Past_Surprises .005 (.001)*** 
Firm_Size .012 (.021) 
R&D 2.077 (.769)*** 
Industry_ R&D  -1.514 (1.126) 
Advertising -.283 (1.267) 
Leverage -.268 (.185) 
Sales_Growth .721 (.151)*** 
HHI  .110 (.661) 
T_Bill 17.003 (27.376) 
Early_ Mention -.017 (.033) 
Wald χ2 620.28 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Two-way cluster standard errors in parentheses for the coefficients. 
Industry dummies (not shown) are also included in the model 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Announcements of New 
Products 
 
 DV: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (measured as percentage) 
 
Over the entire sample 
N=4,898 
Over the sub-sample without earlier 
mentions 
N=4,118 
 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Fama French 
Carhart Four 
Factor Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Fama French 
Carhart Four 
Factor Model 
Firm_NPA -.049(.013)*** -.039(.012)*** -.045(.014)*** -.037(.013)*** 
Competitors_NPA -.208(.101)** -.187(.093)** -.257(.106)** -.212(.098)** 
News_ Sentiment -.065(.027)** -.055(.026)** -.064(.028)** -.055(.027)** 
Past_Surprises -.121(.034)*** -..094(.033)*** -.101(.356)*** -.079(.034)** 
Firm_Size -.223(.102)** -.209(.1)* -.17(.105) -.153(.106) 
R&D 1.866(2.438) 1.318(2.269) 1.581(2.561) .962(2.398) 
Industry_ R&D -3.588(5.543) -4.888(5.462) -.814(5.858) -2.286(5.82) 
Advertising -15.07(4.971)*** -15.75(4.604)*** -16.21(5.164)*** -17.14(5.117)*** 
Leverage -1.753(.797)** -1.509(.817)* -1.653(.817)** -1.474(.832)* 
Sales_Growth -.664(.395)* -.573(.382) -.436(.431) -.313(.409) 
HHI 4.801(4.944) 5.841(4.471) 4.91(5.366) 5.871(4.881) 
T_Bill 
-435.83 
(152.34)*** 
-276.56 
(146.15)** 
-486.32 
(162.58)*** 
-352.66 
(154.72) ** 
Book_to_Market .115(.372) .105(.344) .233(.392) .238(.36) 
Introduction -.048(.253) -.033(.249) .005(.281) .013(.279) 
Multiple .309(.308) .332(.304) .26(.327) .247(.313) 
Word_Count .0002(.0004) .0003(.0004) .0002(.0004) .0003(.0004) 
Early_ Mention .154(.248) .214(.248)   
Wald χ2 1086.45 2725.93 965.94 2485.51 
 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.    
Two-way cluster standard errors in parentheses for the coefficients. 
Industry dummies (not shown) are also included in the model  
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I acknowledge that I could not compile complete information about the 
development of each product, and that prior information about patents and technologies 
included in the product could have still been available to investors (the information could 
have perhaps become available before the product was given a formal name, which is why 
I could not have linked the product with this information through the archival searches). 
However, the confirmatory results that are obtained controlling for specific mentions of the 
product that have occurred prior to the firm formally announcing it, provide some 
reassurance that the main results are not driven by a correlation between the focal 
expectation drivers and the early availability of information about the product. 
In all four models, the results consistently show the same pattern. The counts of past 
new product announcements (p<.05), the recent history of product announcements in the 
industry (p<.05), and the past news sentiment (p<.05) are all negatively associated with the 
announcement CARs. I also control for past CARs, using their average rather than their 
sum, because I posit that the average success of each past announcement increases 
expectations for future innovation strategies. The average past CARs are negatively related 
to current announcement CARs (p<.01; the same result is obtained if the total CAR 
measure is used). 
Consistent with prior literature, firm size is negatively related to announcement 
CARs. In contrast with the Tobin’s Q findings, R&D intensity is not a significant 
determinant of CARs, but advertising intensity is negatively related to CARs (p<.01). This 
negative relationship highlights the main theme in this essay in that it would be erroneous 
to conclude that firms with high advertising expenditures do not earn rents from new 
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products. On the contrary, recent evidence indicates that these firms enjoy higher awareness 
and visibility, have higher liquidity, a larger investment base, and higher firm values 
(Grullon, Kanatas and Weston 2004). Instead, a more appropriate inference would be that 
informational updates coming from these high advertisers are less likely to further impact 
their market value. 
It is somewhat surprising to find an absence of a relationship between CARs and 
announcement content variables (preannouncement, multiple product content, and word 
length). The effect of these variables could potentially be mitigated by qualitative 
aspects of the new product (such as radicalness and market potential) which could not be 
observed and quantified for such a large sample. 
Robustness tests and additional analysis 
Alternative model specifications 
To ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, I perform a 90% 
winsorization of the dependent variables, of the focal independent variables, and of the 
variable that captures the CARs to past announcements. This procedure sets 
observations below the 5th percentile to level of the 5th percentile and observations 
above the 95th percentile to the level 95th percentile (see, for instance, Leary and 
Roberts 2014). I then estimate Equations (5) and (6) with these winsorized variables. 
All factors maintain the original sign and significance, in line with the results of Tables 5 
and 6. I also estimate reduced forms of Equations (5) and (6) in which all focal variables 
are included without control variables. Even though none of the correlations between the 
variables is higher than .45, and the maximum VIF statistics for all the variables is 1.73, 
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I took this step to ensure that the results are not affected by potential multicollinearity in 
the data. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
Finally, I repeat all tests with the past history variables measured over six-month rolling 
windows rather than twelve-month windows. The results for the CAR model are similar 
to Table 5. For the Q model, competitors’ innovation activity and news sentiment 
preserve their positive sign but are no longer significant. The history of past product 
announcements remains highly significant.  
 Differences between high and low output innovators 
Of the 833 firms in the sample, 164 have introduced only one product. For these 
firms I estimate a simple OLS version of the panel models (Equations (5) and (6)) from 
which I exclude the past count of new products and the CARs to past product 
announcements. The results show that past news sentiment is still negatively associated 
with CARs (p<.05) and also with Tobin’s Q. although this relationship is no longer 
significant (p=0.14). Competitors’ innovation output, while carrying the hypothesized 
sign, is not significant in either model. These lower significance levels could be, at least 
in part, due to the low power of the test for such small sample. Alternatively, 
expectations may be more difficult to anchor in past firm activity when there is little or 
no history that investors could use.  
I do find, however, a very strong stock market reaction to the announcements 
made by these single-product firms. Their average CARs are +1.91%, compared to 
+.33% for the remaining announcements, a difference that is both substantive and 
statistically significant (p<.01). The distribution of announcements across SIC codes is 
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very similar for both subsamples, with most innovations coming from SIC codes starting 
with the digit 3, which includes household appliances and electronic equipment. The 
similarity of these distributions indicates that the difference in CARs is not driven by 
industry effects: investors can react strongly to a new product announcement made by a 
firm that has not been actively announcing new products, even if it belongs to an 
industry that has a high rate of new product announcements.  
 Announcements that elicit the strongest market reaction 
To answer this question I compute deciles for the CARs to all announcements. 
In all but the 10th decile the average number of past product announcements per year 
per firm ranges from 5.14 to 7.79. This average is only 3.13 for the decile with the 
highest CARs (average CAR=12%). This statistic illustrates nicely the finding that 
investors react more strongly to announcements coming from firms that have been 
introducing very few number of new products in the past. The average CARs to past 
announcements are also smallest for the top CAR decile - indicating that these were 
firms that had typically underwhelmed investors in the past - but the difference is not as 
striking as the one obtained for the number of past announcements. 
None of the variables that pertain to the content of the announcement provides a 
clean separation of announcements with high, versus low CARs. In some cases the lack 
of significance could be due to the low power. For instance, I find that the CARs to 
preannouncements are .6% and the CARs to introduction announcements are .34%, but 
the difference is not statistically significant. In other cases, the difference does not 
appear to be substantive; the press releases for high and low CAR announcements differ, 
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on average, by only 5 words.  
Announcements that beat the odds 
The results suggest that firms believed to be successful innovators will find it 
increasingly difficult to impress investors with new product announcements. An 
interesting question is whether any firms buck this trend. This is not the focal question in 
this essay; a conclusive answer would require a set up and data analysis worthy of a 
separate study. However, to spur additional research in this direction, I provide some 
preliminary insights into the characteristics of products that generate high CARs despite 
high pre-announcement expectations.  
I begin by narrowing the sample down to announcements that have the highest 
pre-announcement expectations, as measured by the three independent variables in 
Equations (5) and (6). I require each of these three variables and the past surprises to be 
in the highest quartile. From those, I further narrow the sample down to include only 
announcements with which investors were most pleasantly surprised, both with the 
previous product introductions and the focal announcement: I require that the past 
innovation surprises and the announcement-date CARs belong to the top quartile of all 
CARs.  
The subsample of announcements that “beat the odds” contains 42 
announcements. I collect a subsample of 42 matching announcements that “do not beat 
the odds.” The matching announcements are randomly selected from those which have 
the same pre-announcement expectations in the sense that each of the four variables 
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continues to lie in the highest quartile. However, CARs no longer belong to the top 
quartile.  
I analyze these 84 announcements for content, and code them along eight 
dimensions that might be used as informational input by investors: (1) radical or 
incremental innovation; (2) preannouncement or actual introduction; (3) single or 
multiple product; (4) product developed by the firm alone, or as part of a partnership; (5) 
endorsement by external entity such as magazine or consumer group; (6) detailed 
description of the product’s features; (7) announcement made by CEO or other top 
executive; and (8) the presence of details about the consumer needs that the product 
addresses, or the class of customers that it targets. I then compare announcements across 
the two subsamples to see if they differ on any of these eight dimensions. 
I only observe a significant difference in the last dimension, the presence of 
specific details about targeted consumer needs or market segments (Specifically, 55% of 
announcements in the “high CAR” subsample (the one that beats the odds) vs. 39% for 
the “low CAR” sub-sample, contain one or more statements on how the product meets 
consumers’ needs.)3 While I am agnostic of the generalizability of this finding to larger 
samples, it does appear intuitive that uncertainty of demand for the new product is 
                                               
3 To exemplify the type of market segment information, an announcement by Symantec stated "We 
listened to our customers and delivered our award winning NetBackup 7 software in a box that is easy to 
deploy, easy to configure and tightly integrates management and licensing into their existing NetBackup 
environment." And Microsemi specified "This product family addresses requests we've had from long-
time Microsemi customers to supply LED solutions with the same performance, quality, reliability, 
service, and supply chain structure they've experienced with Microsemi's proven CCFL complete system 
solutions." 
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reduced if the target customer need or market segment clearly mentioned, even when the 
parent firm is known to be a successful innovator.  
Long-term returns to innovation 
The main theme in this study—that stock market expectations are higher for 
successful innovators—also carries a broader implication about the long-term stock 
performance of innovating firms. I argue throughout this essay that announcement-date 
CARs are not appropriate performance metrics for innovating firms because rewards to 
innovation are already reflected in stock prices before the announcement. If so, 
successful innovators should be rewarded with stronger stock performances over the 
long term. I test this implication to corroborate the previous findings. 
I evaluate the relationship between the long-term stock returns of innovating 
firms and their unexpected innovation output during the sample period. I measure 
unexpected innovation as the difference between the number of products introduced 
during the twelve-month period prior to each announcement and the number of products 
introduced during the previous twelve-month period. I compute one aggregate value of 
unexpected innovation for each firm, taking the average of each firm’s unexpected 
innovations during the sample period. I then sort all firms into quintiles based on this 
aggregate metric of unexpected innovation. 
To measure long-term stock returns I use the calendar-time portfolio method, 
which automatically accounts for cross-sectional clustering of stock returns (Mitchell 
and Stafford 2000; Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). I group firms into five portfolios, 
each corresponding to one of the five unexpected innovation quintiles. Firms in the 
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highest quintile are those that exceed expectations, and firms in the lowest quintile are 
those that fall short of expectations, in each case, by the largest margin. I compute 
abnormal returns for the two extreme portfolios by regressing each portfolio’s monthly 
returns on the four Fama-French-Carhart factors. The intercepts provide the abnormal 
returns of each portfolio. To assess the statistical significance of the difference in 
abnormal returns, I build a long-short portfolio that takes long positions in top-quintile 
stocks and short positions in bottom-quintile stocks, and regress the returns on the same 
four factors. I also compute a statistic for announcement-day CARs for each portfolio: I 
sum up all announcement-day CARs for all firms in a portfolio and compute an average 
across firms of the summed CARs.  
I find that firms in the top quintile do quite well during the sample period, with 
an average long-term abnormal return of +3.95% per year. At the other extreme, stocks 
in the bottom quintile—those that fall short of expectations—do quite poorly, with an 
average abnormal return of –3.72% per year. The difference between the two (+7.67% 
per year) is statistically significant (p=.003). Interestingly, the summed announcement-
day CARs are negative for firms in the top quintile (−.51% for market-adjusted model 
and −.83% for Fama-French CARs) and positive for firms in the bottom quintile 
(+3.04% and +2.31%, respectively), with the differences between the two quintiles being 
highly significant (p<.001).  
The long-term results are not surprising in view of published research regarding 
the long-term rewards to innovation (e.g., Pauwels et al. 2004). However, together with 
the summed CAR results, they corroborate this essay’s main hypotheses by showing that 
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the relationship between innovation and long-term stock returns remains positive in the 
sample, despite the negative relationship documented in the case of short-term CARs. 
 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
Event study methodology is addressed as a powerful tool to examine the value 
generated from strategic investment decisions, (Fang, Lee and Zhang, 2015 in JM) in 
marketing literature. However, inferences drawn from CARs in event studies do not 
always carefully account for pre-event expectations. CARs provide a good metric for 
assessing the value-added of unanticipated events. However, the use of CARs is more 
problematic for events that are at least partially anticipated. Therefore, inferences drawn 
from CARs should account for, or at least acknowledge, the way in which pre-event 
expectations are formed. 
Categorizing events as anticipated or unanticipated is not always straightforward. 
This seems to be the case for a number of events that are of interest to marketers—
alliances, brand extensions, or market expansions, to name a few. What makes these 
events unanticipated is their infrequent and irregular occurrence and the fact that, with 
the possible exceptions of automobiles, investors do not typically formulate specific 
forecasts about product launch dates or other product details. What makes them 
anticipated is the broader underlying strategy that governs each marketing action. 
To preserve competitive advantage, firms do not typically release the details of 
their marketing strategy, so the anticipated nature of most marketing events is not readily 
apparent. It is perhaps for this reason that prior studies appear to treat them as 
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completely unanticipated. Indeed, a review of the literature identifies a number of event 
studies where inferences drawn from announcement-day CARs suggest a simplistic 
event classification heuristic - one that treats all events as unanticipated unless clear, 
event-specific information is demonstrably available prior to the announcement date.  
I propose here that this simplistic heuristic is inadequate for new product 
announcements. I show that even in the absence of event-specific information, investors’ 
reaction to new product announcements depends critically on firm and industry 
characteristics that provide insights into the broader innovation strategy. And, I argue 
that finding lower announcement-day CARs should not be construed as an unfavorable 
signal about the value of innovation. Quite to the contrary, I document higher long-term 
returns for firms that consistently launch high numbers of new products.   
While the results are derived in the context of new product announcements, the 
more general conclusion is relevant to the broader class of events that are part of 
corporate strategies. Consider, for instance, the case of brand extension announcements 
(Lane and Jacobson 1995). Investors are more likely to expect brand extensions from 
firms that have broader brand portfolios, stronger brand equity, more experience with 
successful brand extensions, from firms that have recently entered into new product 
categories, and from firms that operate in more competitive product categories. Similar 
arguments can be made in the case of alliances, product placements, licensing or 
outsourcing arrangements, category or market expansions, and any other marketing 
events that can be ascribed to a broader underlying strategy.  
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Correctly interpreting the stock market reactions to marketing events is also 
critical for marketing practitioners. An important question in the business literature 
pertains to performance metrics by which managers should be evaluated. Consider the 
case of a marketing manager who joins a new firm, perhaps as a replacement for a 
retired veteran manager with a good track record. If the firm itself is widely recognized 
as a successful innovator, the value of its innovation strategy is already built into the 
stock price. What then defines success for this new manager? And how should it be 
measured? Arguably, from a marketing perspective, the manager’s tenure would be 
judged successful if she can continue the high-quality innovation program initiated by 
her predecessor. And yet, by performing at that level, all that she can expect from the 
stock market in reaction to future product announcements is a series of abnormal returns 
that are essentially zero. Worse, if the manager’s performance is good but falls short of 
expectations, these abnormal returns could turn negative. It is, therefore, difficult to 
evaluate performance using short-term market signals without observing a relevant 
counter-factual scenario, such as the one where the job was offered to another candidate.  
This essay also highlights the importance of managing expectations. Executives 
in innovative firms might want to manage investors’ expectations to avoid irrational 
exuberance. To illustrate, assume that an innovation strategy produces economic rents at 
a rate of 3% per year and the firm is expected to launch a number of new products each 
year. If expectations are carefully managed, the firm would expect the risk-adjusted firm 
value to increase from, say, $100 to $103 during the year, without further market 
reactions on the announcement days. However, if expectations are irrationally exuberant, 
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firm value could first overshoot to $110 before dropping toward the intrinsic value of 
$103. The drop would occur gradually, with each new product announcement, as 
investors’ expectations become more realistic. The former price pattern is desirable 
because it keeps stock prices more informative, which facilitates the implementation of 
meaningful performance metrics.  
The latter, bubble-like pattern is more problematic. A stock price that is not 
informative should not be used as a performance metric. Doing so could create moral 
hazard. For example, managers might be tempted to overpromise, especially if their 
compensation is linked to short-term stock value. Additional nefarious consequences are 
possible if the stock market is particularly illiquid; the correction phase of the bubble 
could overshoot on the down side and the value of the firm could temporarily drop 
below its $103 fundamental value, as margin calls would trigger additional sell orders. In 
rare cases of acute illiquidity this decline could become self-fulfilling and cause real 
economic losses to an otherwise healthy company.  
I argue, therefore, that performance metrics linked to short-term stock returns are 
likely inappropriate for marketing managers, particularly for firms that are already 
successful innovators. Instead, the results of this study recommend the adoption of 
metrics that are linked to longer-term stock value, and also of metrics that are non-
financial in nature, such as market share, units sold, customer satisfaction, and profit 
margins.  
In this essay, my focus has been on new product announcements. It would be 
worthwhile to examine the effect of investors’ expectation about other marketing 
 50 
 
activities that are part of a broader marketing strategy in future studies. This essay was 
restricted by the size of the sample from content analyzing the new product 
announcements in depth. Future research can also expand the horizon of this study by 
examining other product-specific factors that can affect investors’ expectation.  
 51 
 
CHAPTER III  
WHEN 1+1>2: HOW INVESTORS REACT TO CONCURRENTLY 
ANNOUNCED NEW PRODUCT RELEASES AND OTHER CORPORATE 
NEWS 
 
Firms routinely press release the launch of their new products. An examination 
of these press releases shows that in about 7% of cases firms issue new product 
announcements concurrently with another corporate announcement. However, academic 
evidence on the consequences of these actions is lacking, because concurrent 
announcements are routinely eliminated from event studies in an attempt to avoid their 
confounding effects.  
I use a comprehensive sample of press releases issued by publicly traded U.S. 
firms to document the consequences of firms announcing the release of a new product 
concurrently with other positively valenced corporate news item. Drawing on Merton’s 
model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information I first present two 
conditions under which firms benefit more from issuing concurrent new product 
announcements. I then verify that under these conditions, the increase in shareholder 
value from concurrent announcements is higher than the total increase from issuing two 
similar announcements separately. This research provides managerial insights on how 
corporate communications can be leveraged to increase stock prices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New product announcements are important events for their parent firms. 
Managers issue these announcements in the hopes that investors will notice, recognize, 
and reward their new product development efforts. As a result, most new product 
announcements are carefully choreographed, stand-alone press releases. However, in a 
nontrivial number of cases, firms announce new products concurrently with other 
corporate news. For example, on October 26, 2010, Juniper Networks announced the 
introduction of Junos Pulse Mobile Security Suite while also announcing the opening of 
the Juniper Global Threat Center, a facility based in Columbus, Ohio. Similarly, on 
March 18, 2003, findwhat.com announced both the launch of AdAnalyzer and the 
hiring of Ernst & Young as its new independent auditor. 
These examples raise two important questions: Under which conditions are 
concurrent announcements more likely to occur, and when are firms more likely to gain 
from announcing new products concurrently with other unrelated, positively valenced 
corporate news, rather than separately?4 At first glance, the theory of efficient markets 
suggests that, all else being equal, the effect of concurrent announcements should equal 
the sum of the effects of the two announcements issued separately; thus, managers 
should be indifferent between the two options (Fama 1970). Alternatively, prospect 
                                               
4 I focus on the combination of two positively valenced news items because concurrently announcing new 
products with a negatively valenced news item is a rare occurrence. I found that in this extensive, multi-
industry sample which spans 11 years of announcements less than .05% of new product introductions are 
announced concurrently with a negatively valenced news item. Throughout this essay, when I refer to 
concurrent new product announcements it means one new product announcement and one other, distinct 
positively valenced corporate announcement made on the same day by the same firm, but in separate press 
releases. 
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theory suggests that managers prefer to enjoy the stock market gains from positive 
announcements separately and, as such, should avoid making concurrent 
announcements (Linville and Fischer 1991; Thaler 1985). Yet the data in this essay 
show that concurrent announcements are not rare occurrences: approximately 7% of 
new products are announced concurrently with other news. Are these managerial 
actions beneficial to firms? 
Notwithstanding a substantial research stream of event studies of new product 
announcements, the economic implications of concurrent announcements are not well 
understood. Previous event studies have opted to exclude concurrent announcements 
from analysis rather than study them in isolation, because of their confounding effects 
on stock returns (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2014; Lee and Chen 2009; Lee et al. 2000; 
Wooldrige and Snow 1990). As a result, the financial consequences of concurrent 
announcements, despite being of potential substantive interest to managers, remain 
unknown. Insights are also lacking into their prevalence and the conditions that make 
them more desirable. If at least some concurrent announcements elicit more positive 
stock market reactions than the sum of two comparable separate announcements, firms 
should actively use this communication tool when circumstances warrant it. Conversely, 
this strategy should be avoided if concurrent announcements have a negative effect on 
shareholder value. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the 
determinants and consequences of new product announcements made concurrently with 
other positively valenced corporate news. I aim to answer the following research 
questions: 
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1. Under which conditions are firms more likely to make concurrent 
announcements? 
2. When concurrent announcements are made under these conditions, what is their 
financial value? Specifically, do concurrent announcements generate higher 
abnormal returns when compared to the sum of abnormal returns obtained from 
similar stand-alone announcements? 
I start by proposing that concurrent new product announcements meet the 
characteristics of events that Barber and Odean (2008) identify as “attention-grabbing”. 
As such, concurrent announcements can increase the investor base of the firm more than 
stand-alone announcements. In turn, an increase in the relative size of a firm’s investor 
base can reduce the firm’s cost of capital and increase its market value. But this effect 
differs across firms, as Robert Merton shows in his model of capital market equilibrium 
with incomplete information, which provides the theoretical foundation for this essay 
(Merton 1987).  I leverage Merton’s model to propose two conditions when concurrent 
new product announcements are more likely to occur and when they can lead to a 
higher increase in firm value relative to an increase in the investor base of the firm.  
I empirically document the additional value that accrues to stock prices due to 
concurrent new product announcements. I do so by disentangling the effects of the two 
combined announcements and by estimating the average treatment effect (ATE) of 
concurrently issuing the new product release with one other positively valenced 
corporate news item. Using propensity score matching (PSM) I create matched 
counterparts for each of the two combined announcements among the news that were 
announced stand-alone. I then compare the effects of concurrent announcements with 
those of stand-alone announcements (Guo and Fraser 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). I empirically test the hypotheses on a sample that includes concurrent and stand-
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alone new product releases, and other positively valenced corporate announcements 
made by U.S. publicly traded firms from January 2003 to December 2013. The results 
show that the stock market reaction to concurrent announcements is greater than the 
sum of the reactions to similar stand-alone announcements. 
This study makes three contributions to marketing theory and practice. First, 
from a theory standpoint, it contributes to an emerging stream of research on firm 
communications with investors. Much has been written about how firms can improve 
their communications with consumers; researchers are now examining how effective 
firms are at capturing investors’ attention (e.g., Chemmanur and Yan 2009; Grullon, 
Kanatas, and Weston 2004; Kaniel, Starks, and Vasudevan 2007). I theorize and 
provide empirical support for the assertion that issuing a new product release on the 
same day with one other positively valenced announcement increases the likelihood that 
these announcements will stand out in the stock market and be noticed by investors. 
This finding opens the door for additional research on how other types of marketing 
announcements can be sequenced and leveraged to maximize their stock market impact. 
Second, concurrent announcements have been routinely eliminated from event 
studies in the marketing literature, but I argue that they should not be. Eliminating them 
yields an incomplete picture of the phenomenon being studied and could lead to 
inaccurate results. Indeed, their consequences could add new insights to the literature 
and may provide managers with a new set of strategic actions that could be occasionally 
used to benefit their firms. 
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Third, this essay identifies two conditions when concurrent new product 
announcements are beneficial to firms and can lead to an increase in shareholder value. 
The decision to issue such announcements entails a cost-benefit analysis: for instance, 
there may be costs associated with unduly delaying a product announcement in order to 
issue it concurrently with a positively valenced announcement that will be released at a 
later date (Moorman et al. 2012). Guided by the findings of this essay and the 
contingencies that characterize them, managers can better assess the benefits of issuing 
concurrent new product announcements and, potentially, of other types of concurrent 
announcements.   
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows: First, the theory is introduced 
that underlies the hypotheses on the occurrence of concurrent new product 
announcements and on the stock market reaction to these announcements. Next, the data 
is described, the method used to empirically test the hypotheses is explained, and the 
results are presented. Finally, the theoretical and managerial implications from this 
research essay are explained.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
It is not obvious that combining positively valenced announcements benefits 
firms more than issuing the same announcements separately. On the one hand, the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that the total gains from the two 
announcements should be the same, whether they are combined or issued separately. 
Specifically, EMH posits that investors have access to all publicly available information 
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needed to estimate the expected returns of all the stocks in the market (Fama 1970; 
Sharpe 1964). When new information becomes available, EMH assumes that investors 
only react to its content, regardless of the timing or the source of this information 
(assuming that these factors do not in themselves carry additional informational 
content). Thus, all else being equal, the stock market returns from announcing new 
product introductions concurrently with other news should be equal to the combined 
stock returns from announcing the news items separately; that is, the two options should 
be financially equivalent. 
On the other hand, prospect theory suggests that people prefer to segregate 
positively valenced events. Specifically, the hedonic editing hypothesis (Thaler 1985) 
and its variant, the gain-savoring hypothesis (Linville and Fischer 1991), predict that 
people prefer to savor gains separately but integrate losses. In this context, this means 
that managers may prefer to announce positively valenced news separately, to enjoy 
gains in the stock market on different occasions.  
To address this apparent puzzle, I propose another possibility; concurrent 
announcements may increase stock prices by making investors more aware of the firm’s 
stock. In the following sections I draw on research on “attention-grabbing stocks” to 
propose that concurrent announcements increase the investor recognition of the firm’s 
stock (Barber and Odean 2008). I then rely on Robert Merton’s model of capital market 
equilibrium with incomplete information, to identify the conditions under which firms 
benefit most from an increase in investor recognition or its investor base (Merton 1987 
 58 
 
uses the terms investor recognition and investor base interchangeably and I do the same 
in this essay).  
Concurrent announcements and investor recognition 
Finance researchers argue that it is unrealistic to expect investors to access and 
process all publicly available information. Kaniel, Starks and Vasudevan (2007) note 
that “even if news is publicly available, it is not incorporated into investment decisions 
until investors pay attention.” (p.1)  Indeed, there is evidence that investors tend to 
ignore good news if the manner in which it is made publicly available is not particularly 
salient (Huberman and Regev 2001). What, then, can firms do to attract investors’ 
attention? 
Researchers have linked investor attention and breadth of stock ownership to 
advertising, news coverage, or media coverage of the CEO (e.g., Barber and Odean 
2008; Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 20004; Nguyen 2015). For instance, Barber and 
Odean (2008) show that investors are more likely to buy stocks that are in the news than 
stocks that are not. They also show that investors are more likely to pay attention to and 
buy stocks that exhibited extreme one-day returns on the previous day, irrespective of 
their performance on the focal day. This is in part because of their performance, in part 
because these stocks are more likely to be highlighted in various news outlets such as 
Wall Street Journal’s previous day’s big gainers column. I argue that concurrent 
announcements share the characteristics of the events highlighted by Barber and Odean: 
first, they are news, and second, they have a higher chance of moving the stock of the 
firm in an attention-grabbing territory than does a stand-alone positively valenced 
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announcement. For instance, if a stand-alone new product announcement increases the 
price of a stock by 2% and another positively valenced announcement increases it by 
1%, the 3% increase that should, at a minimum, be obtained by releasing the two 
announcements together has a higher chance of attracting investors’ attention than the 
increase produced by either one of the stand-alone announcements.  
 Thus, I propose, and later in this essay I show empirically, that issuing a new 
product announcement concurrently with other positively valenced announcement 
increases investor recognition more than separately issuing two comparable 
announcements. However, firms do not equally benefit from the increase in investor 
recognition. 
 Specifically, I build my arguments on the main take-away from Merton’s 
theoretical model: the required rate of return for each firm’s stock depends on the 
investor recognition of the stock and this rate decreases as investor recognition 
increases (Merton 1987). This means that companies with higher investor recognition 
are able to raise money through the stock market at lower costs. Merton demonstrates 
this argument mathematically in equation (33) in his paper. He presents a set of 
determinants of the marginal increase in firm value due to the increase in investor 
recognition for that firm’s stock. In the next section I identify two of these determinants 
that can serve as a theoretical foundation for the hypotheses in this essay. One factor is 
the value of the firm, captured by the term Vk which appears in the numerator of the 
right hand side of equation (33) and the second factor is investor recognition, qk, which 
appears in the denominator of the right hand side of equation (33). Merton argues that 
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firms with higher value (i.e., firms facing higher expectations of cash flows), and firms 
with lower investor recognition will benefit more from an increase in investor 
recognition and their firm value will increase more. I expand this argument in the 
following subsections. 
Conditions under which concurrent announcements are more likely to occur, and 
their financial consequences 
Firms with high values 
The stock of firms with high values or firms facing high investor expectations of 
future cash flows is likely to trade at a price that is a higher multiple of the firm’s 
earnings. The expensive price of this stock makes it less likely that individuals who are 
part of the firm’s current investor base buy additional stock in that firm. As a result, this 
type of firm will benefit more from expanding its investor base and adding new 
potential buyers who previously have not considered the stock (Merton 1987).  
I select two proxies that correspond to firm value and to expectations of the 
future cash flows. First, I use Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of firm value to the book 
value of assets. Second, I use the news sentiment - the investor sentiment associated 
with past corporate announcements - as a determinant of investors’ expectations of 
future firm performance5. Specifically, when a firm consistently makes announcements 
over a period of time that are positively perceived by investors, investors gradually 
build expectations that this firm will continue to do well in the future. If investors’ 
                                               
5 I formally define news sentiment at time t as the cumulative strength of the valence of the totality of 
news that has been released by the firm over a specified period that immediately precedes time t. 
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expectations are high, the price of that firm’s stock is also likely to be high (relative to 
its current earnings) as it incorporates higher expectations about future earnings. This 
argument applies equally to firms with high news sentiment and to firms with a high 
Tobin’s Q. Therefore, firms with high investor sentiment or high Tobin’s Q are more 
likely to take an action that expands their investor base and attracts new investors, such 
as issuing concurrent new product announcements. Thus, I hypothesize that:  
H4a: Firms that have experienced a higher news sentiment associated with their 
recent corporate announcements are more likely to issue concurrent new 
product announcements than firms whose recent announcements have elicited a 
lower news sentiment. 
H4b: Firms with a higher Tobin’s Q are more likely to issue concurrent new 
product announcements than firms with lower Tobin’s Q. 
Firms with low investor recognition 
I now turn to the second condition identified from Merton’s model where he 
proposes that the lower the investor recognition, the more the firm benefits from 
increasing it. Intuitively, a firm that is known to a majority of investors has a limited 
upside potential from further expanding its investor base. In contrast, the potential to 
find new interested buyers is relatively higher for a firm that is less known to investors 
and has smaller base of current investors.  
I therefore propose that firms are more likely to make concurrent new product 
announcements when they are relatively unknown (the stocks of these firms have been 
called neglected, or generic stocks: Arbel 1985; Arbel, Carvell, and Strebel 1983). The 
intuition behind this contingency is supported by research that has documented a 
positive link between investor recognition and a reduced cost of capital (e.g., 
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Christensen, De la Rosa, and Feltham 2010; Easley and O’Hara 2004). This literature 
suggests that firms in this category have the strongest incentive to leverage a 
communication strategy that can place them on the radar screen of investors who are 
unaware of their stock. I use two commonly used proxies for the size of investor base: 
institutional investor holdings and the number of analysts following a firm (e.g., Arbel 
1985; Baker, Powell, and Weaver 1999). Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H5a: Firms with a lower percentage of shares held by institutional investors are 
more likely to issue concurrent new product announcements than firms with a 
higher percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
H5b: Firms that are followed by a smaller number of analysts are more likely to 
issue concurrent new product announcements than firms followed by a larger 
number of analysts. 
I note that the conditions highlighted in H4a, H4b respectively H5a, H5b are not 
dependent on one another. As an illustration, consider a young biotech firm that has a 
small following of investors who believe that the firm will produce a blockbuster drug 
at some point in the future. This expectation would result in a relatively high firm value 
despite its investor base being low. 
Finally, the last hypothesis follows directly from Merton (1987) and from the 
previous hypotheses. As argued before, concurrent announcements have the potential to 
increase investor recognition more than their stand-alone counterparts. The increased 
investor recognition, in turn, leads to an increase in stock liquidity investor base, a 
decrease in the cost of capital of the firm and an increase in firm value (Gervais, Kaniel, 
and Mingelgrin 2001; Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004; Merton 1987). Thus, when 
firms are in a position to benefit more from investor recognition, issuing concurrent 
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announcements will yield higher returns than their stand-alone counterparts. 
Specifically:  
H6: The stock market reaction to a concurrent new product announcement made 
under the conditions described in H4a,b – H5a,b is greater, on average, than the 
sum of the reactions to a similar stand-alone new product announcement and a 
similar stand-alone positively valenced corporate news item.  
 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Testing the hypotheses requires a comprehensive sample of positively valenced 
corporate announcements, including new product announcements. Most event studies of 
corporate announcements have used archival searches in Dow Jones, LexisNexis, or 
Wall Street Journal Index to identify the news (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; 
Sood and Tellis 2009; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007; Wang, Chen, and Chang 
2011). This method is unwieldy in the context of concurrent announcements. 
Specifically, to prevent selection bias, a complete sample of corporate announcements 
made by the firms included in the sample is needed. Archival searches, which typically 
rely on keywords, cannot guarantee that all corporate announcements are retrieved.  
To overcome the challenges associated with archival searches, I compile the 
sample from RavenPack News Analytics that is described in the first essay.  
RavenPack has a number of useful features described in prvious essay. Relevant 
to this research is the classification of all corporate news into specific categories. To test 
the hypotheses, I compile all the announcements in the “product release” category in 
RavenPack which includes announcements of new products, new services, or upgrades 
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of existing products or services. In addition to product releases, I compile all other types 
of news, such as acquisitions, award announcements, executive appointments and other 
similar categories, announced on the same day as the product releases. I define 
concurrent announcements as events that are issued on the same day by the same firm. 
The events do not need to be announced simultaneously; I define them as concurrent 
news as long as the two events are announced during the same day. Future research 
could expand the window used to define concurrent announcements and study the 
impact of an expanded class of concurrent announcements. 
I use the RavenPack database to obtain all new product releases and other types 
of positively valenced announcements by U.S. publicly traded companies from January 
2003 to December 2013. For each announcement in the sample, the database provides 
the date when it was issued, the name of the parent company, and an event specific 
sentiment score (ESS) as described previously6. 
To obtain a clean, usable sample the following steps were employed: First, the 
focus of this essay is on events whose timing the firm can control; as a result, the sample 
is limited to announcements made directly by the firm through a press release. Second, 
in order to confirm that the press release is generated by the specific parent company I 
only use announcements with relevance score of 100 as explained in the first essay.  
I assemble two subsamples of firm announcements. The first subsample includes 
all product releases and the second subsample includes all other positively valenced 
                                               
6 The features and collection process of the event sentiment score (ESS) is described in the first essay in 
details. Please refer to page 27.  
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corporate announcements, where their sentiment score (ESS) is greater than 507. I collect 
the stock return data from CRSP and financial data from COMPUSTAT.  
I eliminate announcements for which I could not collect the financial data from 
COMPUSTAT or their stock returns from CRSP. Finally, following previous research 
(e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Homburg, 
Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014) to cleanly measure the stock market reaction to the 
concurrent announcements, if the firm has announced any other news items a day before 
or a day after the concurrent announcements, I eliminate the announcements from the 
sample to prevent confounding effects. 
The final sample contains two subsamples. The first subsample includes 28,758 
new product announcements. Of these, 27,596 were stand-alone announcements (they 
were the only press releases issued by the firm on that day) and 1,162 were announced 
concurrently with one other positively valenced corporate news (other than new product 
releases) issued on the same day.  
The second subsample consists of positively valenced corporate news from many 
different categories such as partnerships, acquisitions, awards, facility upgrades, 
executive appointments, etc. This sample includes 53,600 announcements, of which 
52,438 are stand-alone and 1,162 are announced alongside the 1,162 new product 
releases identified earlier.  
                                               
7 I only collect news sentiment scores above 50. This follows directly from the RavenPack’s definition of 
the news sentiment variable that adding a neutral-sentiment news item to a new product introduction is not 
likely to significantly change the stock market reaction to the new product announcement. I also eliminate 
concurrent news with a negative news sentiment (ESS < 50). These are extremely rare occurrences, 
representing less than .05% of the announcements in the sample. 
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Announcements included in the two subsamples are press releases from 2,873 
firms in 58 industries classified by 2-digit SIC codes. I use the complete set of firms that 
have made at least one new product announcement, whether they have made concurrent 
announcements or not, because these are the firms that have the ability to make 
concurrent new product announcements. 
 
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND METHOD 
Measures 
To test H4a to H5b, I use two logistic regressions as follows: (1) one that models 
the probability that a new product announcement will be made concurrently with another 
corporate announcement or stand-alone and (2) one that models the probability that a 
corporate announcement, other than a new product announcement, will be made 
concurrently with a new product announcement or stand-alone. In each model, the 
dependent variable is a categorical, dummy variable. These variables are: 
In the first model, Concurrent_NPA equals 1 if the new product has been 
announced concurrently with another corporate news item and 0 if the new product 
announcement is stand-alone.  
In the second model, Concurrent_News equals 1 if the corporate news (other than 
products releases) has been announced concurrently with a new product release and 0 if 
the corporate announcement is stand-alone.  
Independent variables 
The independent variables included in the logit models are as follows:  
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News sentiment (News_Sentiment): I use firms’ average news sentiment prior to 
the announcements as a proxy for firm value and for investors’ expectations of the firm’s 
future cash flows. If a firm has recently undertaken a string of positively received 
actions, investors expect the firm to continue to do so and to generate high cash flow in 
the future. I measure news sentiment by averaging the Event Sentiment Scores (ESS) for 
all announcements, of all types, made by a firm, six months prior to each announcement 
under consideration. For robustness, I report later in the essay results obtained with the 
same variable computed over rolling windows of 3, respectively 12 months prior the 
event.  
Tobin’s Q (Tobin_Q): I measure firms’ Tobin’s Q prior to each announcement as 
a proxy for the value of the firm (e.g., Morgan and Rego 2009; Rubera and Kirca 2012; 
Sorescu and Spanjol, 2008). Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of firm’s market value to 
its book value for the year prior the announcement and is calculated as: 
Tobin’s Q = 
𝐴𝑇+(𝐶𝑆𝑄×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)−𝐶𝐸𝑄
𝐴𝑇
      (7) 
where AT is the book value of the total assets, Price is the price of the stock, 
CSQ is the number of common shares outstanding, and CEQ is the book value of 
common stocks, all measured prior to the announcement.  
Data used to compute Tobin’s Q is obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
Investor recognition: Arbel (1985) refers to the stock of the firms with small 
institutional holdings, and firms with small or no number of analysts following as 
“neglected stocks”. In line with previous research I use two proxies for investor 
recognition: percentage of shares held by institutions (Institutional_Holdings) and 
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number of analysts following the firm (Analysts) (Arbel 1985; Arbel, Carvell, and 
Strebel 1983; Jain and Kim 2006; King and Segal 2009). Institutional holdings data is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters and data on analyst following is obtained from IBES. 
Control variables 
Frequency of firms’ recent news: To benefit from concurrent announcements, in 
addition to the proposed conditions, firms also need to have the ability to make such 
announcements. Firms that seldom make new product announcements or any other types 
of positively valenced corporate news may need to delay their press releases to be able to 
issue them concurrently, which may not be optimal from a competitive standpoint 
(Moorman et al. 2012). Conversely, firms that frequently make corporate 
announcements will not need to significantly alter the timing of these announcements in 
order to issue them concurrently. These firms have more degrees of freedom as they 
decide whether to combine announcements and which announcements to pair. I account 
for the ability of the firms to make concurrent new product announcements by 
controlling for frequency of firms’ recent new product announcements and other types of 
positively valenced corporate news: 
a) New product announcements (Firm_NPA): To capture the frequency of firms’ 
new product announcements in the recent time, I compute rolling window 
measurements of the number of new product announcements that firms made in 
the six months preceding each new product announcement included in the 
sample. 
b) Other corporate news (Corporate_News): Similar to new product 
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announcements, I control for the frequency of firm’s recent corporate news 
(other than product releases) and compute this variable as a rolling-window 
measurement of the number of all the firms’ corporate announcements (other 
than new product announcements), that firms made in the six months preceding 
the announcement of each corporate news item included in the sample.  
Past concurrent announcements: Firms that have used concurrent announcements 
in the past might be in a better position to understand the conditions under which these 
announcements are effective at increasing the investor recognition and might be more 
likely to identify when these conditions occur and leverage concurrent announcements 
accordingly. I use relative number of concurrent announcements to total announcements 
of the firm as a proxy for such factors and I use two rolling-window variables, 
Relative_Concurrent_NPA and Relative_Concurrent_News, computed as the ratio of the 
counts of the concurrent new product announcements (other corporate announcements) 
to the counts of stand-alone new product announcements (other corporate 
announcements) made by the firm in the six months preceding each new product 
announcement from the firm. I use a relative measure because the absolute number of 
concurrent announcements is correlated with the total number of announcements, which 
is also included in the model estimated.  
Firm-specific factors: The propensity to combine announcements may be different 
for firms of different size and financial status. I control for the firm’s size (Firm_Size) 
using the logarithm of firm assets (e.g., Lin and Chang 2012). I account for firms’ 
financial status by controlling for firm’s financial leverage (Luo, Homburg, and Wieseke 
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2010) and return on assets (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009). 
Industry-specific factors: To control for the effects of industry-specific factors on 
managers’ decision making I include three control variables corresponding to the 
industry’s innovativeness, communication baseline with the investors, and 
competitiveness: 
a) Competitor’s recent new product announcements (Competitors_NPA): Industry’s 
innovativeness is controlled by computing rolling-window measurements for the 
counts of new product announcements made by the firm’s competitors in the six 
months preceding each new product announcement; I define competitors as all 
firms operating in the same three-digit SIC code.  
b) Competitors’ communication baseline with investors (Competitors_News): To 
control for the industry’s communication baseline with investors, I compute 
rolling-window measurements for the counts of the competitors’ corporate 
announcements (other than new product releases) in the six months preceding 
each corporate announcement.  
c) Industry concentration (Industry_Concentration): I control for the industry 
concentration as a measure of the Herfindahl index (e.g., Lee and Grewal 2004; 
Lin and Chang 2012). Similar to previous studies, I calculate the Herfindahl 
index as the sum of the squared percentage of sales of firms in the same SIC 
code. 
Table 6 summarizes the dependent, independent, and control variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
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TABLE 6 
Variables and Data Sources for Evaluating Concurrent New Product 
Announcements 
 
 Conceptual Variable (label) Measured Variable Data Source 
Dependent 
variables 
 
Probability of adding a 
positively valenced corporate 
announcement to a new product 
announcement 
(Concurrent_NPA) 
A dummy variable that equals1 if the 
new product has been announced 
concurrently with another corporate 
news item and 0 if the new product 
announcement is stand-alone. 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Probability of adding a new 
product release to a positively 
valenced corporate 
announcement 
(Concurrent_News) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
corporate news has been announced 
concurrently with a new product 
release and 0 if the corporate 
announcement is a stand-alone. 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Short-term cumulative abnormal 
returns (MAR_CAR, 
MM_CAR, FFC_CAR) 
Cumulative abnormal return (one day 
before to one day after the 
announcement, computed using, 
respectively, the (1) market-adjusted 
model, (2) market model , and (3) 
Fama_French_Carhart model  
CRSP/ 
Fama French 
and Liquidity 
Factors/ 
 
Independent 
variables 
Firm’s news sentiment 
(News_Sentiment) 
Firm-level average of the ESS scores 
for all the firm’s news that were 
published in the six months preceding 
the announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Firm’s previous Tobin’s Q 
(Tobin_Q) 
Firm’s Tobin’s Q for the year 
preceding the announcement   
COMPUSTAT 
Percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors 
(Institutional_Holdings) 
Number of firm’s share in institutional 
holdings divided by firm’s total 
number of shares in the fiscal quarter 
preceding the announcement 
Thomson 
Reuters 
Number of analysts following 
the firm 
(Analysts) 
Total number of analysts following the 
firm in the fiscal quarter preceding the 
announcement 
IBES 
Control 
variables 
Number of recent new product 
announcements (Firm_NPA): 
Number of new product 
announcements made by the firm in the 
six months preceding the 
announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Number of other corporate 
announcements 
(Corporate_News) 
Number of corporate news (other than 
product releases) made by the firm in 
the six months preceding the 
announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Relative number of recent 
concurrent new product 
announcements to recent stand-
alone new product 
announcements 
(Relative_Concurrent_NPA) 
Number of the concurrent new product 
announcements to the counts of stand-
alone new product announcements 
made by the firm in the six months 
preceding the announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
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TABLE 6 Continued 
 Conceptual Variable (label) Measured Variable 
Data Source 
Control 
variables 
Relative number of recent 
positively valenced corporate 
news concurrently announced 
with product releases to recent 
stand-alone corporate news 
(Relative_Concurrent_News) 
Number of the positively valenced 
corporate news announced 
concurrently with new product 
announcements to the counts of stand-
alone corporate news made by the firm 
in the six months preceding the 
announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Number of competitors’ recent 
new product announcements 
(Competitors_NPA) 
Number of new product 
announcements made by firms in the 
same industry (based on 3-digit SIC 
codes) in the six months preceding the 
announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Number of competitors’ recent 
corporate news 
(Competitors_News) 
Number of corporate news (other than 
product releases) announced by firms 
in the same industry (based on 3-digit 
SIC codes) in the six months preceding 
the announcement 
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
Industry concentration 
(Industry_Concentration) 
Herfindahl index: Sum of squares of 
the market shares of all firms in the 
same industry (based on 3-digit SIC 
codes) 
COMPUSTAT 
Firm size   
(Firm_Size) Logarithm of total assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Financial leverage 
(Leverage) 
The ratio of long term book value of 
debt to the firm’s total assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
The ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to the firm’s total 
assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Year 
(year) Year of the announcement  
RavenPack 
News 
Analytics 
 
 
Model Development 
Testing H4a– H5b 
To test H4a– H5b I run two separate logit models that estimate the probability of 
new product announcements being made concurrently with other types of corporate 
news. The first equation estimates the probability that a new product announcement is 
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made concurrently with another positively valenced corporate announcement, as opposed 
to stand-alone. The second equation estimates the probability that a corporate 
announcement (other than a new product release) is made concurrently with a new 
product announcement, as opposed to stand-alone. Thus, in the first model, the focus is 
on product releases, and in the second model, the focus is on other types of corporate 
news:  
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where 𝑋𝛽cij = (𝛽c1 + 𝛽c2News_Sentimentij + 𝛽c3Tobin_Qij 
+ 𝛽c4Investor_Recognitionij  +𝛽c5 Corporate_Newsij + 
𝛽c6Relative_Concurrent_Newsij+ 𝛽c7Competitors_Newsij 
+ 𝛽c8Industry_Concentrationij + 𝛽c9Firm_Sizeij + 𝛽c10Leverageij + 𝛽c11ROAij 
+𝛽c12Yearij + e cij). 
 
In both models, i, and j index the firm and the announcement date, p and c index 
the new product announcement variables and positively valenced corporate 
announcement variables, respectively. The terms epij and ecij are random firm and time-
specific effects, and other variables are as previously defined. Investor_Recognition refers 
to Institutional_Holdings, respectively Analysts, which are included in the models one at 
a time, as they are highly correlated. Year is a linear time trend included to control for the 
possibility that concurrent announcements have increased in recent times. In both models, 
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I adjust the standard errors for possible simultaneous correlations across both firms and 
time in the residuals using two-dimensional clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009)8. 
Testing H6 
To test H6 I verify that the stock market reaction to a concurrent new product 
announcement made under the conditions described in H4a– H5b is greater, on average, 
than the sum of the reactions to the new product announcement and the positively 
valenced corporate news, had they been announced separately. I use the short-term 
event study methodology to compute the stock market reaction to concurrent 
announcements. Short-term event studies are commonly used to measure the stock 
market reaction to a firm’s financial, strategic, or marketing announcements. They 
have been widely used for new product announcements (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991; Sood and Tellis 2005; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), 
acquisitions (e.g., Asquith 1983), partnerships (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002), 
channel additions (e.g., Homburg, Vollmayr, and Hahn 2014), and brand acquisitions 
(e.g., Wiles, Morgan, and Rego 2012). The methodology is well specified over short-
term horizons (see Brown and Warner 1985). 
Specifically, I estimate abnormal returns (AR) for the firms in the sample as 
               ARit = Rit – E(Rit)                                                                                           (10) 
                                               
8 Following Peterson (2009), I assume that pijpjpipij ue    and cijcjcicij ue   , where pi
and ci are firm-specific components, pj  and cj are time-specific components, and piju  and ciju are 
idiosyncratic components unique to each observation. I estimate the variance–covariance matrix as 
)-()((firm)
ˆˆˆ  )ˆ(ˆ timefirmtime VVVarV  . 
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where Rit is the realized rate of return of stock i on day t and E(Rit) is the estimated return 
of the stock i on day t in the absence of the event. I use three alternative ways to compute 
E(Rit) and provide results obtained with all these measures: 
E(Rit )= Rmt           (11) 
E(Rit) = Rft + β(Rmt - Rft)        (12) 
E(Rit) = Rft + β1(Rmt - Rft) +β2(SMBt) + β3(HMLt) +β4(UMDt)   (13) 
where Rmt is the average rate of return of all stocks trading on the US stock market, 
Rft is the risk-free rate of return on a US Treasury bond on the day t, SMB is the difference 
between the rate of returns of small and big stocks, HML is the difference in returns 
between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMD is the momentum factor, all during 
day t.  
Equation (11) corresponds to the market-adjusted model, (12) to the market 
model, and (13) to the Fama-French-Carhart model (Brown and Warner 1985; Carhart 
1997). 
 I calculate ARit as the abnormal return of firm i on day t using each of the 
models above. The daily abnormal returns are then cumulated over a time window (t1, 
t2) around the announcements day, as follows: 
CAR (t1, t2) = ∑ ARit
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1 .                  (14) 
I use a three-day window around the event date (t1 = t – 1, t2 = t + 1) to account 
for possible information leakage during the day before the announcement and for 
possible delays in the dissemination of news during the day after the announcement. I 
compute the CARs for each of the different methods used to estimated expected returns: 
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MAR_CAR are the CARs for the market adjusted model, MM_CAR are the CARs for 
the market model, and FFC_CAR are the CARs for the Fama-French-Carhart model. 
To test H6, I need to show that the CARs to the concurrent announcements are 
significantly higher than the sum of the CARs to stand-alone announcements: 
CAR_Concurrent > CAR_NPA(stand-alone) + CAR_Corporate_News(stand-alone) (15) 
If firms randomly made some announcements concurrently and some separately, 
inequality (15) could have been tested using t-tests of the mean differences between 
CAR_Concurrent and (CAR_NPA(stand-alone) +CAR_Corporate_News(stand-alone)). 
However, firms do not randomly select announcements to be announced concurrently or 
stand-alone; rather, they make concurrent announcements only under specific 
circumstances that need to be accounted for. To eliminate selection bias, I would ideally 
need to observe, in relation to each concurrent announcement, the counterfactual stand-
alone new product announcement and the counterfactual stand-alone corporate 
announcement that constitute the concurrent announcement. Because these 
counterfactual announcements are not available, I employ an appropriate statistical 
matching method, namely Propensity Score Matching (PSM), to control for the potential 
endogeneity resulting from the non-randomly-assigned treatments (Angrist, Imbens, and 
Rubin 1996; Verbeek 2008). PSM has been widely used in economics (e.g., Dehejia and 
Wahba 1999), information systems (Rishika et al. 2013), strategic management (e.g., 
Chang, Chung, and Moon 2013), and marketing research (e.g., Garnefeld et al. 2013; 
Wangenheim and Bayón 2007). This method leverages matching techniques that 
identifies the “statistical twin” of each treated observation in the pool of untreated ones 
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(Guo and Fraser 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
Several matching techniques have been proposed in the literature (for a review, 
see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). I present the main results using matching done with 
the nearest neighbor with caliper. In the robustness section I report results using an 
alternative method, Kernel matching. The nearest neighbor method is a one-on-one 
matching method that has been shown to be the most effective in reducing bias (the 
difference between the treated and untreated group) and is preferred when researchers 
have large samples of untreated observations relative to the treated group.  
PSM uses a propensity score as the criterion to find the most similar match to 
the treated observation. I use the estimated probability obtained from equations (8) and 
(9) as the propensity score used for matching. Nearest neighbor PSM matches each 
treated announcement (concurrent) with the untreated one (stand-alone) that has the 
closest propensity score to the treated announcement (e.g., Bronnenberg, Dubé, and 
Mela 2010; Huang et al. 2012; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). To increase the quality of 
matching and to ensure that the propensity scores in the control samples are reasonably 
close to those in the treated samples, nearest neighbor with caliper requires that the 
absolute distance between the two propensity scores be less than a predetermined 
caliper (ε), calculated as ε = .25σP, where σP is the standard deviation of the propensity 
score (Guo and Fraser 2010).  
To increase the similarity between announcements in the treated and control 
groups and to account for the unobservable industry- and firm-specific factors not 
included in the logit models, I conduct two separate types of matching. In the first 
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matching method, I require that the matched announcements belong to the same 
industry. In the second matching method, I require that the announcements belong to 
the same firm. This second type of matching is more conservative and may lead to a 
loss of data that can be used to test H6, but it offers a cleaner comparison between the 
treated and control groups because it helps control for unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
For each one of the matching methods (within the same industry or within the 
same firm) I run two matching procedures. The first PSM runs through the sample of 
new product announcements and finds the Matched_NPA for each treated new 
product announcement according to the estimated probability from the logit model of 
equation (8). The second PSM runs through the sample of other positively valenced 
corporate news and finds the Matched_News for each concurrent corporate news item 
according to the estimated probability from the logit model of equation (9).  
After obtaining the two control groups for each type of matching, I align the 
Matched_NPA and Matched_News with the corresponding concurrent 
announcements to calculate the treatment effect as follows: 
Treatment effect = CAR_Concurrent – [CAR_Matched_NPA+ 
CAR_Matched _News]          (16) 
The average of these differences for all the announcements in the treated 
group is the average treatment effect (ATE): 
ATE_CAR = Average {CAR_Concurrent – [CAR_matched_NPA + 
CAR_Matched_News]}             (17) 
To test H6 I run t-tests on the ATE_CAR defined in (11) above.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics. Panels A and B of Table 7 show descriptive 
statistics for the subsample of new product announcements and, respectively, positively 
valenced corporate news (other than product releases). The second and third columns 
include means of variables for the concurrent and the stand-alone announcements.  
The average CARs are positive and significant for all three subsamples: 
concurrent, stand-alone new product announcements, and stand-alone other 
announcements (all p-values <.001). In terms of the new product announcements, the 
findings are in line with prior research which has found that investors reward, on 
average, new product introductions. In terms of the other types of corporate 
announcements, the significantly positive average CARs provide face validity for the 
ESS score that was used to determine the valence of these announcements.  
Table 7 also reports the correlations matrix for each subsample. The correlations 
between the three CAR variables are high (.93% or higher) indicating that the abnormal 
returns measured with the three alternative methods are similar. The correlation between 
institutional holdings and number of analysts is also high in both subsamples (.60 in 
panel A and .70 in panel B). This is consistent with research in accounting that has 
documented a strong link between analysts’ decisions to follow firms and institutional 
investors’ decisions to hold the same firms in their portfolios (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan 
1990). Therefore, I use them as alternative measures of investor recognition in separate 
models. 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample to Evaluate the Concurrent New Product Announcements (2003-2013) 
 
A: Descriptive Statistics for the Subsample of New Product Announcements 
 
Variables 
New Product Announcements Correlationsa 
Concurrent  
 
N=1,162 
Stand-Alone  
 
N=27,596 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
1
4 
 Mea
n 
SD Mea
n 
SD               
MAR_CAR (%) (1) .423 5.4 .310 5.1 1              
MM_CAR (%) (2) .505 5.4 .357   5.0 .95 1             
FFC_CAR (%) (3) .421 5.4 .305 5.0 .93 .95 1            
News_Sentiment(4) 59.25 3.8 57.04 4.1 -.03 -.03 -.03 1           
Tobin_Q (5) 2.07 1.3 2.11 1.5 -.00 -.01 -.00 .09 1          
Institutional_Holdings (6) .43 .49 .55 .46 -.03 -.03 -.03 .03 .04 1         
Analyst (7) 12.08 12.1 8.58 10.
9 
-.04 -.03 -.04 .23 .11 .60 1        
Firm_NPA (8) 8.55 10.1 3.61 5.6 -.02 -.02 -.03 .45 -
.01 
.04 .35  1       
Relative_Concurrent_ 
NPA (9) 
.14 .19 .06 .15 -.01 -.01 -.01 .21 .01 .01 .16 .33 1      
Competitors_NPA (10) 176.6 176.
8 
162.6 172
.9 
.00 .00 .00 .20 .19 -.00 .07 .08 .06 1     
Industry_Concentration 
(11) 
.21 .18 .18 .16 -.01 -.01 -.01 -
.031 
-
.13 
-.00 .00  .07 .03 -
.45 
1    
Firm_Size (expressed in 
billion dollars) (12) 
107.1
7 
297.
7 
29.29 142
.3 
-.08 -.08 -.08 .23 -
.19 
.11 .48  .45 .25 -
.19 
.20  1   
Leverage (13) .16 .18 .15 .20 -.01 -.01 -.01 -
.054 
-
.11 
-.06 -
.04  
.03 .01
0  
-
.21 
.13  .21 1  
ROA (14) .024 .22 -.041 1.4 .00 -.00 .00 .01 .01 .052 .05  .02 .02 .01 .01 .11 .01 1 
a Correlations are based, in each case, on the full sample corresponding to that panel (stand-alone + concurrent announcements) 
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TABLE 7 Continued 
B: Descriptive Statistics for the Subsample of Other Positively Valenced Corporate News  
 
Variables 
Other Corporate 
Announcements 
Correlations 
Concurrentb 
 
N=1,162 
Stand-Alone  
 
N=52,438 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
1
4 
 
Mea
n 
SD Mean SD               
MAR_CAR (%) (1) .423 5.41 .500 6.92 1              
MM_CAR (%) (2) .505 5.36 .508 6.91 .95 1             
FFC_CAR (%) (3) .421 5.37 .522 6.93 .93 .95 1            
News_Sentiment(4) 
59.2
5 
3.82 56.11 4.15 
-
.03 
-
.03 
-
.03 
1           
Tobin_Q (5) 2.07 1.34 1.97 1.43 
-
.00 
-
.01 
-
.00 
.09 1          
Institutional_Holdings (6) .43 .49 .53 .49 
-
.03 
-
.02 
-
.03 
.03 .04 1         
Analyst (7) 
12.0
8 
12.07 6.99 9.25 
-
.04 
-
.04 
-
.04 
.23 .11 .60 1        
Corporate_News (8) 
15.8
7 
12.43 8.25 6.02 
-
.02 
-
.02 
-
.03 
.45 
-
.01 
.04 .35 1       
Relative_Concurrent_News 
(9) 
.19 .19 .08 .14 
-
.01 
-
.01 
-
.01 
.21 .01 .01 .16 .33 1      
Competitors_News (10) 
643.
6 
667.4 488.6 
616.
2 
.00 .00 .00 .20 .19 .00 .07 .08 .06 1     
Industry_Concentration (11) .21 .18 .20 .18 
-
.01 
-
.01 
-
.01 
-
.03 
-
.13 
.00 .01 .07 .03 
-
.45 
1    
Firm_Size (expressed in 
billion dollars) (12) 
107.
2 
297.7 35.68 
178.
47 
-
.08 
-
.08 
-
.08 
.23 
-
.19 
.11 .48 .45 .25 
-
.19 
.20 1   
Leverage (13) .16 .18 .17 .20 
-
.01 
-
.01 
-
.01 
-
.05 
-
.11 
-
.06 
-
.04 
.03 .01 
-
.21 
.13 .21 1  
ROA (14) .024 .22 -.056 1.48 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .05 .05 .02 .01 .01 .01 .11 .01 1 
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Test of hypotheses  
Results for H4a– H5b  
Table 8 shows the results for the logit models. Panel A of Table 8 shows the 
results for equation (8). The first two hypotheses (H4a and H4b) postulate a positive effect 
of the news sentiment and Tobin’s Q on the likelihood that the new product will be 
announced concurrently with other news. The coefficients for the firm’s news sentiment 
and Tobin’s Q are positive and significant in both models A-1 and A-2 (βp2 = .058 (for A-
1) & .062 (for A-2), p<.01 for news sentiment, and βp3 = .056 (for A-1) & .061 (for A-2), 
p<.05 for Tobin’s Q). The results support H4a and H4b: firms are more likely to issue 
concurrent announcements when they face high expectations about future cash flows. 
H5a and H5b focus on the effect of investor recognition on the likelihood that the 
new product will be announced concurrently with other news. The coefficient for the 
institutional holdings is negative and significant in model A-1 (βp4 = -1.69, p < .01). 
Similarly, the coefficient for the number of analysts following is negative and significant in 
model A-2 (βp4 = -.022, p < .01). These results are consistent with H5a and H5b: firms that 
are less recognized by investors are more likely to make concurrent announcements in 
hopes of increasing their investor recognition and subsequently their firm value. 
Panel B of Table 8 provides the results for equation (9). The coefficients for all 
independent variables are consistent with these presented in Panel A (βc2=.076 in B-1 & 
.083 in B-2, βc3 = .091 in B-1 & .081 in B-2, p<.01 for all, βc4 = -1.45 p<.01 in B-1, and βc4 
= -.014 p<.05 in B-2). Therefore, H4a – H5b are supported in both subsamples.  
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TABLE 8 
Determinants of the Propensity to Make Concurrent Announcement  
A: Determinants of the Propensity to Concurrently Announce New Product 
Announcements with Other Corporate Announcements 
 
DV : Concurrent_NPA (N=28,758) 
 
Model A-1 Model A-2 
News_Sentiment  
.058*** 
(.011) 
.062*** 
(.011) 
Tobin_Q  
.056** 
(.027) 
.061** 
(.027) 
Institutional_Holdings  
-1.69*** 
(.23) 
- 
Analyst  - 
-.022*** 
(.0060) 
Firm_NPA  
.010 
(.0091) 
.015* 
(.0090) 
Relative_Concurrent_NPA  
.31 
(.19) 
.43** 
(.19) 
Competitors_NPA  
.0011*** 
(.00028) 
.0011*** 
(.00026) 
Industry_Concentration  
.79*** 
(.30) 
.71*** 
(.26) 
Firm_Size   
.25*** 
(.023) 
.27*** 
(.024) 
Leverage  
.019 
(.015) 
.062 
(.018) 
ROA  
.068 
(.18) 
-.0089 
(.018) 
Year 
-.0031 
(.015) 
-.013 
(.013) 
Wald χ2 243.91 315.03 
Log-likelihood -4325.10 -4393.05 
Pseudo R2 .19 .14 
AIC 8676.20 8812.11 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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TABLE 8 Continued 
B: Determinants of the Propensity to Concurrently Announce Other Corporate 
Announcements with New Product Announcements  
 
DV : Concurrent_NPA (N=53,600) 
 
Model B-1 Model B-2 
News_Sentiment 
.076*** 
(.010) 
.083*** 
(.0094) 
Tobin_Q  
.091*** 
(.031) 
.081*** 
(.029) 
Institutional_Holdings  
-1.45*** 
(.21) 
- 
Analyst  - 
-.014** 
(.0071) 
Corporate_News  
.018** 
(.0072) 
.019** 
(.0075) 
Relative_Concurrent_News  
.60** 
(.27) 
.73*** 
(.26) 
Competitors_News  
.00055*** 
(.00010) 
.00050*** 
(.00009) 
Industry_Concentration  
.63* 
(.36) 
.51 
(.31) 
Firm_Size   
.28*** 
(.034) 
.24*** 
(.029) 
Leverage  
-.38 
(.31) 
-.31 
(.28) 
ROA  
.17 
(.28) 
.0026 
(.027) 
Year 
.032** 
(.015) 
.0061 
(.015) 
Wald χ2 406.29 296.06 
Log-likelihood -4537.05 -4639.70 
Pseudo R2 .22 .14 
AIC 9100.10 9305.41 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
 
 
The coefficients for competitors’ innovation output are positive and significant 
(p < .01 in models A1 and A2). The coefficients for the extent to which other firms in 
the industry issue announcements are also positive and significant (p < .01 in models 
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B1 and B2). These results indicate that managers of firms operating in innovative 
industries and these with a high volume of announcements are more likely to make 
concurrent new product announcements to increase the likelihood that they will be 
noticed against a larger volume of competitor news and new product announcements. 
The coefficient for firm size is positive and significant in all models (p < .01) which 
shows that larger firms are more likely to concurrently announce their new products 
with other positive corporate news than smaller firms. The coefficient for industry 
concentration is positive in models A1 and A2 only: since this variable is measured 
using the HHI index, and in conjunction with the positive effect of size, this effect 
suggests that concurrent announcements are more likely to occur in industries in which 
a few large firms are competing for investors’ attention. Firm’s financial leverage and 
ROA have no significant effects on the likelihood to make concurrent new product 
announcements.  
Results for H6 
I examine the impact of concurrent announcements on abnormal returns by 
verifying that ATE_CAR>0. First, to perform the matching, I extract estimated 
probabilities from the logit models presented in the previous section. The estimated 
probabilities can be chosen from models A-1 and B-1 or from models A-2 and B-2. To 
choose the propensity score, I compare the explanatory power and goodness of fit for 
the two groups of models. The goodness of fit measures for logit models are provided 
in the last four rows of Panel A and B in Table 8. Pseudo R2 statistics are higher for A-1 
(.19) compared to A-2 (.14) and for B-1 (.22) compared to B-2 (.14). Additionally, A-1 
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and B-1 have lower AICs compared to A-2 and B-2, respectively. Therefore, I use 
estimated probabilities of the logit models A-1 and B-1 as propensity scores for the 
matching procedure. Results obtained from models A-2 and B-2 are not reported but are 
substantively similar to the ones I present in this essay. 
After running PSM and obtaining the two matched groups I follow previous 
research and test the quality of matching by calculating the percentage reduction in bias 
(PRB) (Granefeld et al. 2013; Wangenheim and Bayón 2007). PRB shows how much 
the bias (the difference of mean of covariates between treated and untreated group) has 
been reduced after matching. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) define PRB as: 
PRB= 1- |
(𝑋𝐴−𝑋𝐴′)
(𝑋𝐵−𝑋𝐵′)
|        (18) 
where  
XA = the mean for the treatment group after matching (treated observations that have a 
match) 
XA’= the mean for the non-treatment group after matching (matched observations), 
XB = the mean for the treatment group before matching (all treated observations) 
XB’= the mean for the non-treatment group before matching (untreated observations). 
 
Table 9 shows the PRB of the matching for both new product announcements 
and other positively valenced corporate news when matched within the same firm. The 
average PRB is 88.82% for the sample of new product announcements, and 82.93% for 
the sample of the other positively valenced news. The average PRB indicates that the 
matching has reduced the bias by more than 82%. That is, the differences between the 
mean of variables in treated and matched sample is 82% less than the differences in 
means of variables between the sample of treated and untreated announcements. This 
compares favorably with previous research and suggests the matching is good (e.g., 
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Granefeld et al 2013; Wangenheim and Bayón 2007).  
 
 
TABLE 9 
Means Before and After Matching and Percentage Reduction in Bias (PRB) for 
Concurrent New Product Announcements 
 
A: Mean Differences and PRB for the Matching Of New Product Announcements 
(Within the Same Firm Nearest Neighbor With Caliper) a 
 
  
Before Match After Match 
PRB N(treated)=1,162 N(treated)=916b 
N(untreated)=27,596 N(matched)=916 
Variables 
Mean 
difference 
(treated – 
untreated) 
t 
Mean 
difference 
(treated – 
matched) 
t (%) 
News_Sentiment 2.2 17.76 0.12 0.73 94.55 
Tobin_Q -0.036 -0.82 -0.014 -0.23 61.11 
Institutional_Holdings -0.12 -8.76 0.0015 0.047 98.75 
Analysts 3.5 10.59 -0.79 -1.32 77.43 
Corporate_NPA  4.95 28.01 0.04 0.092 99.19 
Relative_Concurrent_NPA 0.078 16.80 -0.013 -1.43 83.33 
Competitors_NPA 13.97 2.69 2.76 0.35 80.24 
Industry_Concentration  0.034 7.00 -0.0042 0.52 87.65 
Firm_Size  1.84 24.98 -0.021 -0.18 98.86 
Leverage  0.017 2.90 0.00022 0.028 98.71 
ROA  0.065 1.61 -0.0018 -0.18 97.23 
Average PRB for the matching model 88.82 
a The PRB table for matching within the same industry is not shown due to space 
limitations. The average PRB for within-industry matching is 68.9% for matching of new 
product announcements and 74% for matching of other corporate news. Matching has a 
lower quality compared to matching within the same firm because the procedure does not 
account for unobservable firm-specific variables. 
b: I was able to match 78.8% of concurrent announcements. 246 observations are omitted 
due to the restrictions of the matching method: when the matching is within the same firm 
and it uses a caliper not all treated observations have a match that meets all imposed 
matching conditions. The restrictions are less stringent in matching within industry and I 
match 1,050 (90.4%) of the concurrent announcements. 
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TABLE 9 Continued 
B: Mean Differences and PRB for the Matching Of Other Corporate Announcements 
(Within the Same Firm Nearest Neighbor With Caliper) 
 
  
Before Match After Match  
PRB 
N(treated)=1,162 N(treated)=916 
N(untreated)=52,43
8 
N(matched)=916 
Variables 
Mean 
difference 
(treated – 
untreated) 
t 
Mean 
differenc
e 
(treated – 
matched) 
t (%) 
News_Sentiment 3.13 24.06 -0.015 -0.86 99.52 
Tobin_Q 0.099 2.34 -0.031 -0.51 68.69 
Institutional_Holdings -0.1 6.79 -0.01 -0.45 90.00 
Analysts 5.09 18.42 -0.99 -1.66 80.55 
Corporate_News  7.62 41.23 0.24 0.45 96.85 
Relative_Concurrent_News  155.07 8.47 -0.49 -0.016 99.68 
Competitors_News  0.11 27.06 -0.012 -1.38 89.09 
Industry_Concentration  1.9 25.02 0.014 0.12 99.26 
Firm_Size  0.011 2.11 0.0048 0.58 56.36 
Leverage  -0.0081 -1.33 0.0046 0.61 43.21 
ROA  0.08 1.84 -0.0088 -0.93 89.00 
Average PRB for the matching model 82.93 
 
 
I also conduct a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare the distribution of the 
propensity score in the treated and untreated group versus in the treated and matched 
group. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that compares the concurrent 
announcements with the untreated stand-alone announcements, is less than.001 while 
the p-value of the test that compares the concurrent announcements and matched stand-
alone announcements is equal to 1 (for both matching within firm and within industry). 
These statistics provide evidence of similarity of propensity score distributions in the 
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treated and matched groups. The visual evidence for the distribution of propensity to 
announce concurrently in each group (treated- matched and unmatched) are also 
provided in Figure 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Propensity to Announce Concurrently  
 
A: Histograms for the Matching with Nearest Neighbor with Caliper – Within the Same 
firm 
 
 
Sample of New Product Announcements 
Sample of Other Positively Valenced  
Corporate News 
  
 
 
Category 0 = Un-matched stand-alone announcements  
Category 1 = Concurrent announcements 
Category 2 = Matched stand-alone announcements  
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FIGURE 1 Continued 
B: Histograms for the Matching with Nearest Neighbor with Caliper – Within the Same 
industry 
 
Sample of New Product Announcements 
Sample of Other Positively Valenced  
Corporate News 
  
 
Category 0 = Un-matched stand-alone announcements  
Category 1 = Concurrent announcements 
Category 2 = Matched stand-alone announcements  
 
 
Finally, I proceed with the matched samples to calculate the ATE_CAR defined 
in (17) and to test that ATE_CAR > 0. Panel A of Table 10 shows the test of ATEs for 
all three CAR models. The ATEs for all three CAR models are positive and significant. 
These results indicate that the average CARs for the concurrent announcements are on 
average .4% higher than the sum of the CARs for stand-alone new product 
announcements and stand-alone positively valenced corporate news. Thus, concurrent 
announcements positively contribute to firm value when made under the conditions 
previously described and incorporated in the logit model.  
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TABLE 10 
Average Treatment Effects of Concurrent New Product Announcements  
 
A: Average Treatment Effects of Concurrent New Product Announcements on Stock 
Market Returns 
Average Treatment Effects 
PSM variables (Nearest Neighbor with 
Caliper) 
CARconcurrent - [CARmatched-NPA + 
CARmatched-corporate-news] 
Match within the 
same industry 
N=1,050 treated vs. 
1,050  matched 
Match within the 
same firm 
N=916 treated vs. 
916 matched 
ATE_MAR_CAR (%) .400** .475** 
ATE_MM_CAR (%) .446** .424** 
ATE_FFC_CAR (%) .387** .375** 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.   
 
 
B: Average Treatment Effects of Concurrent New Product Announcements on Investor 
Recognition  
Average Treatment Effects PSM variables (Nearest Neighbor with Caliper) 
 Match within the 
same industry 
N=1,050 treated vs. 
1,050  matched 
Match within the 
same firm 
N=916 treated vs. 916 
matched 
ATE_Change_Institutional_Holding (%) 
CIHconcurrent - [CIHmatched-NPA + CIHcorporate-
news] 
1.03** 1.11** 
ATE_Change_Analysts 
CAconcurrent - [CAmatched-NPA + CAcorporate-
news] 
.063** .077** 
ATE_Change_TradingVolumeevent window 
(%) 
CTVEconcurrent - [CTVEmatched-NPA + 
CTVEcorporate-news] 
8.75*** 6.87*** 
ATE_Change_TradingVolumequarterly (%) 
CTVQconcurrent - [CTVQmatched-NPA + 
CTVQcorporate-news] 
3.72** 3.61** 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
CIH= Changes in institutional holdings in the fiscal quarter, CA= Changes in number of analysts 
in the fiscal quarter, CTVE=Changes in trading volume in the event window, CTVQ=Changes in 
trading volume in the fiscal quarter. 
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Process check: Are concurrent announcements associated with changes in investor 
recognition? 
For each concurrent announcement and its matched stand-alone counterpart I 
calculate the changes in the institutional holdings and number of analysts from the 
period before to after the announcements. These two metrics are available on a quarterly 
basis. I therefore, compare the value of these variables in the quarter immediately 
preceding the announcement with the one that immediately follows it. If concurrent new 
product announcements increase firm value due to an increase in investor recognition, as 
Merton (1987) indicates, a higher growth should be observed in institutional holdings 
and number of analysts after concurrent announcements rather than the sum of changes 
after the matched stand-alone announcements.   
As a robustness check I also calculate the changes in the trading volume. Trading 
volume, defined as the total number of shares that changes hands during each trading 
day, has been used in previous research as a proxy for visibility of the firm’s stock 
(Barber and Odean 2008; Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin 2001). Trading volume 
captures not only awareness, but also expectations of higher stock returns (Gervais, 
Kaniel, and Mingelgrin 2001), and therefore is a weaker proxy than the main 
independent variables. However, it is the only proxy for investor recognition for which 
data is available on a daily basis. Hence, it enables the researchers to calculate the 
changes in investor recognition inside the window of the focal event, and allows 
documenting a more precise association between the concurrent announcement and the 
increase in investor recognition. I measure changes in trading volume as the difference 
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between the average daily trading volume of the stock for the three day window of the 
event (1 day before to 1 day after, i.e., the measurement window for CARs) and the three 
day window immediately preceding the event. For robustness, I also calculate this 
variable for the quarter before to the quarter after the announcement in line with the 
measurement window used to assess changes in institutional holdings and in the number 
of analysts following the firm. 
In a similar manner with the test conducted to assess the relative CARs that 
accrue to concurrent announcements I run a t-test on the ATE for changes in investor 
recognition for each of the four alternative proxies described above. The results appear 
in Panel B of Table 10. The ATEs for all four variables are positive and significant 
(p<.05 or better), suggesting that after making concurrent new product announcements, 
firms experience, on average, an increase in their institutional holdings, number of 
analysts following their firm, and the volume of their shares trading in the stock market. 
This process check provides empirical evidence for the investor recognition mechanism 
presented in support of the hypotheses. The positive ATE for trading volume measured 
in the window of the announcements also confirms the assertion derived from Barber 
and Odean (2008); concurrent new product announcements are indeed more likely to 
turn the firms’ stocks into attention-grabbing stocks than their stand-alone counterparts. 
Overall, the results are in line with the predictions of Merton’s (1987) model and 
highlight one manner in which firms can leverage their corporate communications to 
increase shareholder value.  
A summary of the significant effects of all analyses is presented in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 
Summary of Results for Evaluating the Concurrent New Product Announcements 
Conditions under which concurrent announcements are more likely to occur 
Theory driven 
High expectations of future cash flows Low investor recognition 
Positive news 
sentiment 
associated with 
recent corporate 
announcements  
 High Tobin's Q  Small percentage of 
shares held by 
institutional 
investors 
Small number of 
analysts following 
the stock 
Empirical: Control variables with significant coefficients 
Firm level Industry level 
Large 
firms 
Firms who 
have more 
frequently 
made 
concurrent 
announcements 
in the past 
Firms with a 
large volume 
of corporate 
announcements 
Lower 
concentration 
industries 
High volume of 
corporate 
announcements 
made by competitors 
Consequences of concurrent announcements made under the conditions 
identified in the essay 
Concurrent announcements 
increase firm value 
Concurrent announcements increase investor recognition 
Higher CARs than the sum of 
CARs from stand-alone 
similar announcements 
Higher increase 
in volume of 
trade during the 
event window 
compared to the 
sum of increases 
associated with 
stand-alone 
similar 
announcements 
Higher increase in 
the percentage of 
shares held by 
institutional 
investors in the 
post-announcement 
quarter compared to 
the previous quarter 
relative to the sum 
of increases 
associated with 
stand-alone similar 
announcements. 
Higher increase in 
analysts following 
the stock in the 
post-
announcement 
quarter compared 
to the previous 
quarter relative to 
the sum of 
increases 
associated with 
stand-alone 
similar 
announcements. 
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Robustness tests and additional analysis 
Alternative PSM technique 
 To establish the robustness of the results I conduct the empirical analysis using 
an alternative matching technique in the PSM analysis used to obtain the ATEs. 
Specifically, I run a weighted matching method, Kernel matching, within the same firm 
and the same industry. In this method, each treated observation is paired with each 
untreated observation, one at a time, and a weight that reflects the closeness of the 
propensity scores for the two observations is assigned to each pair. Each treated 
observation is then matched with a weighted combination of all untreated observations, 
reducing the possibility that treated observations remained unmatched. The ATE is 
obtained by subtracting the effect of the treated observation from the weighted average 
of the effect of the untreated group. This method leads to a smaller reduction in bias but 
is useful when researchers have small samples of untreated observations and risk having 
a significant portion of the treated observations being left unmatched. While this is not 
the case in the context of this essay, I nevertheless check the robustness of the results by 
using the Kernel method and I find that the results obtained with the two matching 
methods are similar for the sample. 
Controlling for time and sequence of announcements 
In addition to calculating the ATE for the overall sample, to control for the effect 
of the distance in time between announcements, I test H6 on three smaller subsamples: 
(i) one where announcements are matched within the same firm and the same year; (ii) 
one where announcements are matched within the same year only; and (iii) a subsample 
 96 
 
for which news are at most three months apart. Although these three subsamples 
constitute only a fraction of the original sample, the ATEs for CARs in all three 
subsamples are also positive and significant (p < .05 or better).  
Furthermore, I repeat the analysis controlling for the sequence of stand-alone 
announcements matched with the concurrent news. I divide the sample into two groups: 
(1) the announcement date of Matched_NPA is before the announcement date of 
Matched_News (50.2% of announcements) and (2) concurrent news matched with a new 
product announcement published after the other positively valenced corporate news 
(49.8% of announcements). The difference between ATEs for the two samples is not 
statistically different from zero. Next, I examine whether the timing and order of the two 
concurrent announcements affect the main result. Recall that the concurrent 
announcements are separate press releases made by the same firm on the same day, but 
RavenPack provides the exact time of the day when the press release is issued. I found 
no difference in average CARs between the group in which the new product 
announcement was issued earlier in the day of announcement than the other corporate 
announcement, and the group in which the other corporate announcement was issued 
first. 
Controlling for the content of announcements 
The PSM technique I used in the empirical analysis ensures that the concurrent 
announcements are comparable to their stand-alone counterparts on all observable 
variables included in the two logit models. Furthermore, I matched announcements 
within firm and year, which controls for firm and time heterogeneity. However, this 
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method does not control for the unobservable heterogeneity that pertains to the content 
of each announcement. To partially address this limitation, I conduct one last robustness 
test on a subsample of the data. I randomly select 200 concurrent new product 
announcements, 200 stand-alone new product announcements selected from the matched 
group (Matched_NPAs) of the PSM analysis, and 200 stand-alone new product 
announcements not selected as part of the matching sample (untreated group). I content-
analyze these announcements to determine whether they differ in terms of content. I 
code each announcement on the following six dimensions: (1) the innovativeness of the 
product announced, coded using a dictionary of words from prior research (Sorescu, 
Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007); (2) whether the announcement is a preannouncement or 
the announcement of an actual introduction; (3) whether the announcement was made by 
a chief executive officer (CEO) versus another firm representative; (4) whether the 
announcement was made by any top-level executive versus a public relations 
representative9; (5) the number of words in each announcement; and (6) whether the 
announcement is about a product developed in-house or through an alliance. The last 
four dimensions may provide some indication of the significance of the product to the 
firm. I then compare the subsamples on each dimension.  
I found that approximately 14% of concurrent new product announcements are 
for radically innovative products, compared with 11% for matched stand-alone new 
                                               
9 Top-level executives identified in the sample announcements are: Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Marketing Officer, Chief Finance Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Technology Officer, and Chief 
Operation Officer 
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product announcements. In addition, 26% of concurrent new product announcements are 
preannouncements, compared with 20% for matched group. Approximately 14% of 
concurrent announcements are announced by CEOs and 22% by top executives, while 
15% of matched stand-alone new product announcements are announced by CEOs and 
24% by top executives. The average number of words in the press releases is 769.7 for 
the concurrent group and 746.5 for the matched group. 15.5% of the concurrent and 17% 
of the matched new product announcements are developed through an alliance. All 
differences are statistically nonsignificant. 
Alternative control variables 
Finally, I also checked whether the results are robust to the length of the time 
period used to compute the backward-looking, rolling-window variables that measure 
past corporate activities of the firms in the sample. I recompute all rolling-window 
variables over 12-month, respectively 3 months windows, in addition to the 6-month 
time frame used to report the main results, and reestimate the logit models and the ATEs. 
The results remain consistent with those obtained with the 6-month window. 
 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS  
 The analysis of a large sample of new product announcements shows that almost 
7% of new product introductions are announced concurrently with another corporate 
news item. However, extant research provides no guidance to managers to either avoid 
or encourage concurrent new product announcements. The financial consequences of 
concurrent announcements are unexplored in the marketing literature because all event 
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studies of new product announcements eliminate them to avoid confounding effects. The 
current research is a first attempt to explain when these announcements occur and to 
measure their effect on stock prices. 
 The nature of the data does not allow determining whether the concurrent 
announcements were intentionally issued on the same day or were simply the product of 
chance. However, I interviewed several executives who confirmed that most firms 
closely control the release of all announcements by ensuring that they are issued from a 
unique public relations office10. Therefore, most firms are likely to carefully manage 
their press releases. This may be particularly true for good news, the type of 
announcements I focus on in this essay. Firms do not have an unlimited supply of good 
news, and therefore concurrent announcements are unlikely to be just a by-product of a 
high volume of unimportant corporate news. 
The data indicate that concurrent new product announcements are more likely to 
occur when firms have high stock market values, have a history of corporate 
announcements that have been positively received by investors, and have low investor 
recognition. I argue that issuing announcements concurrently makes their content stand 
out from the informational flow facing investors. I verify that firms are successful in this 
endeavor, as investor recognition of their stock increases more after concurrent new 
product announcements than after stand-alone ones. And, the stock market reaction to 
                                               
10 Specifically, at the 2015 Theory + Practice in Marketing conference in Atlanta I interviewed 6 upper 
management individuals employed by firms in industries ranging from the financial sector to gaming and 
entertainment. 
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concurrent new product announcements made under these conditions is higher, on 
average, than the sum of the stock market reactions to similar stand-alone 
announcements.  
This research contributes to the marketing literature by providing a rationale for 
the decision to make concurrent corporate announcements, as well as a contingent 
framework for when they are most beneficial to firms. I focused on new product 
announcements to keep the theory simple and the data analysis manageable. However, 
new product announcements are not the only marketing actions that firms announce 
concurrently. Other types of concurrent corporate announcements have likewise been 
discarded in empirical research. The method I propose here can also be used to 
investigate the financial consequences of other types of concurrent announcements, such 
as announcements of brand extensions, partnerships, business contracts, acquisitions, 
and market expansions. This essay also contributes to the finance literature by providing 
an empirical test of Merton’s model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete 
information in a unique context that has not been previously studied (Merton 1987). 
 The average firm in the sample made approximately three new product 
announcements and eight other positively valenced announcements in a six-month 
period: this indicates that concurrent announcements are not infeasible given the flow of 
corporate communications documented in this essay. The contribution resides in 
pointing out when this feasible action is valuable; specifically, I offer prescriptive 
implications for the managers of two very different types of firms: niche firms with a 
low investor base and high value firms that are striving to meet high investor 
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expectations. The theory in this essay predicts that concurrent announcements occur 
more frequently and are more beneficial under these conditions, but future research 
could pinpoint alternative mechanisms that link corporate communications to 
shareholder value and additional conditions when they yield an increase in value. 
This essay provides novel insights into concurrent new product announcements, 
but many other aspects of these announcements could be investigated further. First, a 
more detailed content analysis of two announcements made concurrently could help 
further qualify the financial gains of these announcements. Second, I explored the 
consequences of combining two positively valenced announcements, mainly because 
few new product announcements are paired with negative news. However, other types of 
positively valenced corporate announcements could be announced alongside bad news. 
If so, it would be fruitful to determine the financial consequences of these types of 
concurrent announcements.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION  
 
Although stock market reactions to the announcements of firms’ marketing 
actions have been studied for many years, there are many aspects that are yet to be 
explained. This dissertation focuses on a critically important corporate activity that has 
relevance to marketing, namely innovation and new product development, and 
investigates two aspects of the stock market reaction to innovation announcements that 
have been overlooked in previous studies.  
The first essay sheds lights on the expectation formation of investors about the 
firms’ future activities based on their past actions. The findings show that the stock 
market reaction to a new product announcement is negatively related to (1) the number 
of new products previously announced by the firm, (2) the number of new products 
previously announced by the firm’s competitors, and (3) the average sentiment of past 
public news issued by the firm. These same three factors are also positively related to the 
market value of the firm measured immediately prior to each new announcement, 
controlling for increases in firm value directly attributable to past new product 
announcements. These results suggest that investors’ expectations need to be accounted 
for, when making inferences from the results of event studies that examine events that 
are part of a broader strategy.  
The second essay investigates the effect of concurrently announcing new 
products with positively valenced corporate news (unrelated to the new product release). 
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The results document a positive difference in abnormal returns (relative to the sum of the 
abnormal returns obtained by separate similar announcement) for firms that issue 
concurrent new product announcements when (1) they face high investors’ expectation 
or have high value, and/or (2) they have a small investor recognition, and they are in 
need of an increase in their investor recognition.  
This dissertation contributes to marketing literature by offering new insights into 
how new product announcements influence firm value. Additionally, the results of this 
dissertation provide helpful insights to managers on when and how to introduce their 
new products in order to maximize the firm’s financial value and their investor 
recognition.  
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts from Published Event Studies that Examine Events that Can Have Past 
Occurrences (First Essay) 
Paper Focal event Event Part of a Strategy-Driven 
Sequence of Events? 
Raasens, 
Wuyts, and 
Geyskens 
(2012) 
NPD outsourcing announcements 
Yes: Firms can potentially 
outsource the development of 
several new products through 
time. 
Boyd, 
Chandy, and 
Cunha (2010) 
Announcement of a CMO appointment 
Yes: The authors cite statistics 
stating that the average CMO 
tenure is 23 months, thus CMO 
announcements can occur 
relatively frequently. (p. 1162) 
The authors also state that only 
19% of their sample constitutes 
announcements of newly created 
CMO positions. 
Sorescu, 
Shankar, and 
Kushwaha 
(2007) 
The preannouncement of a new product. 
Yes: Many firms have a history of 
preannouncing their products. 
Homburg, 
Vollmayr, 
and Hahn 
(2014) 
Announcement of an increase in distribution intensity 
("an expansion of the number of channel entities at a 
particular level within an existing channel, such as 
wholesalers or retailers" p. 41) or the addition of a new 
channel. 
Yes: Firms can increase their 
number of wholesalers or retailers 
on more than one occasion. 
Wiles, 
Morgan, and 
Rego (2012) 
Announcement of acquisition or disposal of brands from 
a firm's portfolio. 
Yes: Firms can repeatedly buy 
new brands or sell old ones. 
Karniouchina, 
Uslay, and 
Erenburg 
(2011) 
Product placement in movies. The effect of product 
placement is assessed in a window around the movie 
release date. 
Yes: Firms repeatedly place 
products in movies. For instance, 
the authors report that Coca Cola 
was placed in 75 movies included 
in their sample. 
Chen, 
Ganesan, and 
Liu 2009) 
The announcement of a product recall by the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC). The authors 
distinguish between proactive recalls, done at the 
initiative of the firm, and passive recalls, which are issues 
only after serious consumer complaints have been made 
to the firm or the CPSC. 
Yes: Many firms have issued 
multiple recalls through time, or 
have faced product harm crises 
that may or may have not 
involved recalls. 
Wiles and 
Danielova 
(2009) 
Product placement in movies. The effect of product 
placement is assessed in a window around the movie 
release date. 
Yes: Firms repeatedly place 
products in movies.  
Rao, Chandy, 
and Prabhu 
(2008) 
The announcement of a new product introduction in the 
biotech industry (FDA approval announcement). The 
sample includes both products that were introduced by 
single firms and products introduced by alliances. 
Yes: Firms typically have a 
history of product introductions.  
Fornell et al. 
(2006) 
"The ACSI [score release] announcement for a firm as 
(simultaneously) published in The Wall Street Journal 
and on the ACSI Web site." (p.7) 
Yes: ACSI scores are announced 
at regular intervals of time. 
 
